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Abstract
WS-Security provides basic means to secure SOAP traffic, one envelope at a
time. For typical web services, however, using WS-Security independently for
each message is rather inefficient; besides, it is often important to secure the in-
tegrity of a whole session, as well as each message. To these ends, recent speci-
fications provide further SOAP-level mechanisms. WS-SecureConversation intro-
duces security contexts, which can be used to secure sessions between two parties.
WS-Trust specifies how security contexts are issued and obtained.
We develop a semantics for the main mechanisms of WS-Trust and WS-Secu-
reConversation, expressed as a library for TulaFale, a formal scripting language
for security protocols. We model typical protocols relying on these mechanisms,
and automatically prove their main security properties. We also informally discuss
some limitations of these specifications.
∗This is an extended version of a paper to appear at the ACM Workshop on Secure Web Services, October
29, 2004, Fairfax VA, USA.
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1 Introduction
The recent specifications WS-Trust and WS-SecureConversation provide mechanisms
for communicating parties to establish shared security contexts and to use them to
secure SOAP-based sessions. This paper investigates the security guarantees offered
by these specifications by constructing formal models in the TulaFale scripting lan-
guage [6]. We built our models by studying both the specifications and the WSE im-
plementation [24]. Modelling reveals some potential vulnerabilities as well as allowing
us to prove some formal properties.
Background: Web Services Security Web services are built on asynchronous com-
munication of SOAP envelopes [29]. The mechanisms of WS-Security [26] provide
means to secure these messages to achieve end-to-end security, using security tokens.
Examples of security tokens include X.509 certificates, username tokens, and XML-
encoded Kerberos tickets.
In itself, WS-Security provides mechanisms for securing a single envelope. How-
ever, typically a web service and a client may interact by exchanging series of messages
grouped in sessions. While in principle WS-Security could secure each separate mes-
sage of the session, this can become inefficient (for example, if X.509 certificates are
used in each message). Also, it is often desirable to guarantee integrity of a whole
session, and not just each message. For instance, a client querying two services should
not be led to attribute a response to the wrong service.
Session establishment is of course not a new issue in cryptography: indeed, nu-
merous classic protocols aim at the mutual authentication of the parties involved in
the session, the negotiation of various parameters for the session, and the protection of
further traffic. (See for example [11, 27, 14, 17].) Moreover, their main secrecy and
authentication properties have often been thoroughly studied. Most of their concepts
and mechanisms can be usefully applied to SOAP-based protocols, but experience also
suggests that this adaptation is not straightforward.
Background: WS-Trust and WS-SecureConversation Building on top of WS-
Security, WS-Trust [21] describes how security tokens are requested and issued by
SOAP processors; it relies on a dedicated security token service (STS) to evaluate re-
quests and issue tokens. Moreover, WS-SecureConversation [20] describes the usage
of one such token, named a security context token. The token points to a security con-
text (SC) typically shared between a client and a web service; its contents can be used
to derive keys to protect traffic between these two parties.
Figure 1 shows a typical usage scenario of WS-Trust and WS-SecureConversation.
It roughly corresponds to the sample protocol given in a WSE tutorial [16]; we refer to
this tutorial for additional implementation details.
Three SOAP processors are displayed: a client, a security token service STS, and
a web service. For simplicity, both the STS and the service are co-located and share a
session cache (the dashed line in the figure). The STS is configured to establish secure
contexts, SCs, with authenticated clients, to be used between clients and services. The
first two steps are mechanisms covered by WS-Trust, while the latter exchanges (step 3)
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Figure 1: A typical protocol relying on WS-Trust and WS-SecureConversation
are specified by WS-SecureConversation.
The execution proceeds as follows. At step 1, the client contacts the STS with a
Request Security Token (RST) message, including some form of identity token plus
information about the target service. The STS, after authorization of the request, gen-
erates a new secure context SC, caches it and replies with a Request Security Token
Response (RSTR) message, including a security context token (SCT) to indicate a new
SC has been created (step 2). Crucially, the RSTR contains enough information to
allow the client to compute the same SC (with the same shared secret) as the cached
version. This allows the client and service to start exchanging messages (step 3) pro-
tected using keys derived from the shared secret of the SC.
Our Contribution We propose a formal counterpart to web services security speci-
fications for session management, as a collection of predicates and processes reflecting
their semantics. We describe a realistic but partial threat model for web services, essen-
tially an active attacker with some access to insider secrets. We develop simple, typical
protocols relying on these specifications, and experiment with their implementation us-
ing WSE. We state and prove a series of core security properties for these protocols,
thereby gaining confidence in our model of these specifications. We also informally
discuss some limitations and potential vulnerabilities.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first formal analysis of these two web
services specifications, and these are the most complex SOAP-based security protocols
yet formalized.
Structure of the Paper Section 2 reviews our prior work on modelling web services
security. Section 3 outlines the WS-Trust specification and Section 4 formalizes an
RST/RSTR exchange conforming to WS-Trust. Theorem 1 shows that the exchange
allows the two parties to reach agreement on a security context. Theorem 2 shows
that the key associated with the newly-established security context is a secret shared
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between the two parties. Section 5 outlines the WS-SecureConversation specification
and Section 6 develops a formal model of request/response exchanges conforming to
WS-SecureConversation, that builds on an initial RST/RSTR exchange. Theorem 3
shows that the two parties can agree on the contents and correlation of the first request
and response, and that the secrecy of the request and response bodies is preserved,
Theorem 4 generalizes these results to unbounded sequences of exchanges, and shows
that the parties agree on the contents of the whole session, and that the secrecy of all
bodies is preserved. Finally, Section 7 discusses related work and Section 8 concludes.
This extended version of the paper includes the scripts used to obtain our re-
sults. Appendix A sketches the manual part of the proof of Theorem 4. Appendix B
lists the scripts used for automated proofs. TulaFale itself is available from http:
//Securing.WS.
2 Modelling Systems and Threats
The security results in this paper are relative to the formal threat model of Dolev and
Yao [12]. In this model, protocol participants use idealized cryptographic primitives,
and there is an active attacker able to record, compute, and send messages, but not
simply to guess secrets.
Our formalizations are based on TulaFale [6], an XML version of the Dolev-Yao
model embedded within the pi calculus. The pi calculus [25] is a theory of concurrency
in which concurrent computations are expressed within a small syntax of message-
passing processes that communicate on named channels. A computation in the pure
pi calculus consists of a sequence of reductions in which a message is passed from a
sender to a receiver process. When considering cryptographic protocols in the pi calcu-
lus, protocol participants are written as explicit processes, whereas the active attacker
is thought of as an arbitrary unknown process running in parallel to the protocol par-
ticipants. There is a wide range of formal techniques, including automated tools, for
analyzing such models of cryptographic protocols expressed in variations of the pi cal-
culus. In particular, our TulaFale tool makes use of Blanchet’s ProVerif analyzer [7, 8].
This section divides into two parts. The first part reviews the TulaFale language.
The second part explains the particular threat model considered in this paper.
2.1 Systems Modelling in TulaFale
A TulaFale script defines an explicit system of multiple parallel processes, representing
protocol participants. Processes interact by sending and receiving messages on a fixed
set of channels. (In the pi calculus, processes may additionally generate channels at
runtime.) Messages are terms in an algebraic model of XML, with signature and en-
cryption primitives represented by idealized cryptographic functions [4]. The message
formats of typical Dolev-Yao formalisms are rather abstract, and omit many details of
the wire representation. In contrast, the TulaFale message format has the detailed struc-
ture of XML, and hence is sensitive to rewriting attacks that exploit this structure, such
as for instance the compound structure of XML digital signatures. Moreover, we can
directly transcribe the message formats of web services specifications into TulaFale,
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and check fidelity of the model with respect to messages generated by implementa-
tions.
We use logic programming to construct and check messages. For example, the
following predicate asserts that the term tok is a username token [26, Section 6.2] for a
principal with username u and password pwd, and that k is the symmetric key derived
from this password using the nonce n and the timestamp t embedded in the token.
predicate isUserToken (tok:item,u,pwd:string,n:bytes,t:string,k:bytes) :−
tok = <UsernameToken>
<Username> u </>
<Nonce> base64(n) </>
<Created> t </>
</>,
k = psha1(pwd,concat(utf8("WS-Security"),concat(n,utf8(t)))).
All the predicates shown in the remainder of the paper are extracted from the
code of our executable formal model [3]. For the sake of brevity, TulaFale omits
all XML namespace information, and uses some non-standard abbreviations, such
as omitting the tag in a closing element bracket </>. Also, literal strings such as
"WS-Security" are always quoted, whether they are within attributes or elements.
Unquoted identifiers, such as u in <Username>u</>, are variables. Every variable
has a sort: a string is an XML string, an item is an XML element or string, and a bytes
is an array of bytes. Function symbols such as base64 and psha1 are abstract represen-
tations of operations on the data model; the function psha1 is an idealized hash function
with no inverse. Given certain implementability constraints [4], predicates may be used
in different modes, depending on whether each parameter is an input or an output. In
our example, if tok and k are output parameters, and all the other parameters are inputs,
TulaFale computes the two outputs, to yield a username token and its associated key.
We model web services and their clients as explicit processes that send and receive
messages on a single soap channel, which models arbitrary transport layers for SOAP
messaging. We annotate processes with events to indicate different phases of proto-
cols. There are two kinds of events, begin and end, to mark initiation and apparently
successful completion, respectively. Events carry data such as participant identities
and the contents of messages exchanged. We model the unknown active attacker as
an implicit process that runs alongside the explicit processes, and which may interact
with them via public channels, such as soap. By default, all channels are public; the
attacker process has no direct access to any channels marked private, which typically
model private databases shared between one or more clients and servers.
For a given TulaFale script, a run is any series of (potentially nondeterministic)
pi calculus reductions and events starting from the explicit system composed with the
attacker. The attacker process is arbitrary, except it may not itself generate any events.
The observable result of a run is a set of events. Our authentication results are one-
to-many correspondences [30] (also known as non-injective agreements [23]) between
events. We formulate these as robust safety theorems: that in every run of the system,
every occurrence of an end event has a corresponding begin event carrying the same
data. For instance, authentication of an RST message is expressed as a correspondence
between events marking the client sending and the server receiving the RST. Most
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security properties of TulaFale models stated in this paper are proved automatically by
compiling to an intermediate pi calculus, and then running ProVerif.
2.2 Principals, Authentication Materials, Sessions, and Key Leak-
age
Our models assume the following participants and authentication materials:
• A single certification authority (CA), with public/private keypair kr/sr, that is-
sues X.509 public-key certificates identifying clients and services, signed by the
private key sr.
• Multiple principals, each identified by a username u, and equipped with pass-
words or X.509 certificates issued by the CA.
We assume a single trusted database (coded as messages on a private channel
anyPrincipal) that relates usernames to passwords or private keys and certificates. We
allow each principal to have multiple passwords and multiple certificates. A certifi-
cate for principal u has subject name u. This database is not accessible to the attacker,
but is accessible to client and server processes acting on behalf of users. In practice,
of course, access to this database would be achieved by partial replication, but this is
outside our model.
We do not fix a particular principal population; instead, we provide public channels
to allow the attacker to trigger the generation of fresh authentication materials for arbi-
trary usernames. Similarly, we do not fix any particular protocol sessions or bound the
number of concurrent sessions. We allow the attacker to initiate sessions with arbitrary
principals in the roles of clients and servers, and with other parameters chosen by the
attacker.
We assume the attacker never gains knowledge of the private key of the CA. How-
ever, to model insider attacks, we allow passwords, private keys, and security contexts
to leak to the attacker. In our setting, we say a principal is unsafe if any of their pass-
words or private keys has been leaked to the attacker; otherwise, we say the principal
is safe. Similarly, we say a WS-Trust security context is unsafe if it has been leaked to
the attacker, and is safe otherwise.
In summary, our system model provides an interface—a set of public channels—to
the attacker, giving it the following abilities:
• To send and receive on the soap channel.
• To trigger the generation of a fresh password or a new certificate for any princi-
pal.
• To initiate sessions and provide their parameters to clients and servers.
• To cause the leak of passwords or certificates for any principal (but not the cer-
tificate authority).
• To cause the leak of established security contexts.
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This amounts to a realistic threat model for XML rewriting attacks on web services;
it is essential to consider vulnerabilities due to unsafe principals—insider attacks—and
indeed we describe such vulnerabilities. (Other threats to web services outside the
scope of this model include SQL injection attacks in SOAP payloads and buffer over-
runs on the networking stack.) Our formal properties concern safe principals, and hold
despite the active attacker’s ability to craft messages using the authentication materials
of unsafe principals. This model of systems and potentially unsafe principals is similar
to the TulaFale model in an earlier paper [5].
3 Web Services Trust Language
WS-Trust “provides a framework for requesting and issuing security tokens, and to
broker trust relationships” [21]. We survey and discuss its contents, focusing on the
parts modelled in this paper. We refer to the specification for additional information.
3.1 WS-Trust as a Protocol Framework
WS-Trust introduces dedicated web services, named security token services (STS),
that handle requests for security tokens (RSTs), and send responses (RSTRs). Like
any SOAP messages, envelopes carrying RSTs and RSTRs may be protected using a
selection of mechanisms described in WS-Security.
WS-Trust is deliberately abstract; it provides a general terminology, some precise
XML syntax for exchanged data, and an informal description of their usage in context
establishment protocols. On the other hand, it avoids defining complete protocols;
for instance, it never prescribes any kind of authorization procedure for establishing a
security context.
In a common case, a single exchange establishes context: the client sends an RST as
the body of an envelope; the STS replies with an RSTR as the (partly encrypted) body
of another envelope; and both envelopes include security headers for authentication.
However, other flows of RSTs and RSTRs are possible. In more complex ex-
changes, any subsequent messages received by the STS are also formatted as RSTRs.
In addition, STSs may initiate exchanges by sending unsolicited RSTRs. STSs im-
plement three SOAP actions and corresponding message elements for managing se-
curity tokens: for issuance, renewal, and validation. Moreover, these elements need
not appear as envelope bodies; they may also be embedded in the security headers of
envelopes carrying some other primary payload. WS-Trust allows security token ex-
changes to be nested. For example, a client may need to contact several STSs in order
to accumulate enough cryptographic evidence before accessing a service; similarly, an
STS may contact other STSs in the process of gathering security tokens. Finally, this
traffic may itself be protected using tokens previously exchanged.
The goal of these exchanges is to reach an agreement on a security context (SC)
shared between different parties. The nature of the agreement is left unspecified. For
instance, an STS may simply be a public repository for X.509 certificates that accepts
anonymous requests and responds with matching certificates, with no particular trust
relationship or agreement at the end of the exchange. On the other hand, an STS may
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establish a protected session between a client and a service, after authenticating the
client and enforcing access control to the service, thereby ensuring a precise agreement
between the client and the service.
Our formal model (in Section 4) focuses on the core security aspects of WS-Trust.
The model omits some other aspects: renewal and validation actions; error handling;
unsolicited RSTRs; and advanced algorithm negotiation and delegation mechanisms.
WS-Trust also proposes an optional attribute RequestSecurityToken/@context for cor-
relation between RST and RSTRs. In our model, we rely instead on the message iden-
tifier of the enclosing envelope, which plays a similar role.
3.2 Syntax for RST/RSTR Exchanges
In the following, we focus on STSs implementing a simple, two-message RST/RSTR
exchange for establishing a security context, as described in the specification [21, Sec-
tion 6.1-2]. We begin by explaining the detail of the syntax of these messages and their
intended semantics, which we accurately reflect in our models.
Principals: An RST may contain a BaseToken, typically an X.509 certificate or a
username token, that identifies the requesting principal and that is used to au-
thenticate the enclosing envelope. Alternatively, the RST may be anonymous.
The RST may also contain an <AppliesTo> indicating the service with whom
the client wishes to establish a security context.
Keying: WS-Trust provides optional mechanisms for key establishment: both the
client and the STS may include some (encrypted) fresh random value, referred
to as entropy; the established context key, if any, is either one of these values,
or their joint hash. In the latter case, for instance, each party decrypts the
other party’s entropy, then computes sckey = psha1(clientEntropy,stsEntropy)
and stores this key as part of the newly-established security context. A benefit of
this computation is that the freshness of the key is guaranteed, irrespective of the
other party’s choice of entropy. (Conversely, if for instance the client accepts an
STS-only key, an unsafe STS may supply an arbitrary key, possibly already used
in another session.)
Negotiation: RSTs may include additional information, used for instance to demand
some choice of cryptographic algorithm or policy, or to provide further au-
thorization materials. We deal abstractly with such additional information, by
recording it in the security context.
As a first concrete example of TulaFale code modelling WS-Trust, we give the
predicates verifying the structure of RST and RSTR elements in our script. Anticipat-
ing WS-SecureConversation, we assume that "SecurityContextToken" (SCT)
is the type of the requested security token: a basic token with an identity and a key,
computed here from client and server entropies.
predicate EntropicRST(rst:item,srvURI,ref:string,etok,ExtraInfo:item):−
rst = <RequestSecurityToken>
<TokenType>"SecurityContextToken"</>
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<RequestType>"Issue"</>
<AppliesTo><EndpointReference>srvURI</></>
<Base><SecurityTokenReference>ref</></>
<Entropy>etok </>
ExtraInfo
</>.
The STS decomposes each incoming RST with this predicate; it relies on pattern
matching to decompose a (presumed) rst element passed as the first argument into a
series of elements. The constant parts in the pattern ensure the RST is a request for
SCT issuance; srvURI provides information on the intent of the SCT, here the URI of
the web service; etok is the client entropy, encrypted for the service; ref is a fragment
URI to the security token identifying the requestor; finally, ExtraInfo collects elements
not explicitly used in our model, but perhaps trusted by the protocol participants.
RSTRs returned by the STS include a Requested Security Token, indicating the
identifier of the (newly created) SCT and a Requested Proof Token, containing (typi-
cally encrypted) server entropy used to compute the SCT key. It may also include an
<AppliesTo> (not necessarily matching the RST).
predicate EntropicRSTR(rstr:item,srvURI:string,BaseToken:item,
uriSTS:string,sctid:string,etok:item):−
rstr = <RequestSecurityTokenResponse>
<AppliesTo><EndpointReference>srvURI</></>
<RequestedSecurityToken>
<SecurityContextToken>
<Identifier>sctid</></></>
<Entropy>etok </>
<RequestInfo>
BaseToken
uriSTS </>
</>.
The client decomposes each incoming RSTR with this predicate; it extracts the
srvURI (implicitly comparing it to the request srvURI if this parameter is bound when
calling the predicate) and the STS’s contributions to the SC (namely its identifier sctid
and its encrypted entropy etok).
Our model extends the specification to require that the RSTR include a non-standard
element, <RequestInfo>, with additional information about the RST, namely the
token used to sign the RST and the URI it was sent to. As detailed in Section 4.5,
without this extension, it is not possible to securely correlate the RSTR with its RST.
3.3 Towards an Explicit Agreement on the Exchange
Session establishment is a well-studied goal for cryptographic protocols. In contrast
to specifications of fixed protocol, however, WS-Trust omits several important aspects
that should be carefully considered when assembling a protocol.
Crucially, RST/RSTR exchanges aim to establish shared security contexts, but the
contents of these contexts (including the participants’ intentions) is left implicit. This
can be a source of confusion, inasmuch as the flexibility of web services enables many
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different levels of agreement between processors sharing a context. Ideally, the specifi-
cations should help secure precise agreements on security contexts between clients,
STSs, and servers. Following well-established prudent practices, a simple way to
achieve strong agreement would be to supplement the syntax of RSTs and RSTRs
with (optional, well-defined) data on the exchange, such as selected modes for au-
thentication and keying, and identities of the requester, issuer, and target service. It is
also important that this syntax be specified, so that its presence and contents can be
validated.
For a given system, one should explicitly state what is guaranteed, both when an
STS accepts an RST and issues an RSTR, and then when a client accepts an RSTR.
These guarantees depend both on the contents and processing of the RST and RSTR.
Hence, one should carefully review:
1. what needs to be agreed upon—typically not just the SCT key;
2. what is passed in the RST/RSTR (notably the signed materials in these mes-
sages);
3. whether the web service implementations actually provide an agreement based
on their processing of the exchange.
In a given implementation, an effective agreement depends on details of envelope
processing. Still, the safety of security contexts should not overly rely on implemen-
tation choices. At least, whenever an exchange succeeds, the protocol designer may
expect that any piece of data recorded in the security context is authentic. In compari-
son, traditional session establishment protocols like SSL [14] or IKE [17] have specific
options and guarantees to reach precise agreements, typically covering at least any data
exchanged by the protocol.
Following the scenario illustrated in Figure 1, we define a concrete agreement.
The agreement should at least cover the actual contents of SCs observed in the WSE
implementation: a shared SCT identifier, a key, and some identity information for the
three involved principals. It should also cover security parameters used in the exchange,
such as:
• Whether the RST client is authenticated or anonymous. For instance, a client
may be convinced it is authenticated because its signature was accepted, whereas
the STS received an unsigned request with the same message identifier and as-
sumed an anonymous token was requested.
• Whether both the client and server, or the server alone, provided entropy. A
mismatch may lead to an apparently successful SC recording a bad key.
• Any data used to authorize the issuance of the RSTR, such as the security token
providing client authentication, or credentials presented in the RST.
• The URI and action for the STS. This may matter if different STSs enforce dis-
tinct authorization policies for the same service.
We arrive at the following content for the security context in our model, expressed
as a TulaFale predicate:
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predicate SC(SC:item,sctid:string,sckey:bytes,mode:string,
UserToken,StsInfo:item,appTo:string,extra:item) :−
SC = <SecurityContext>
<Identifier>sctid</>
<Key>base64(sckey)</>
<Base>UserToken</>
<STSInfo>StsInfo</>
<AppliesTo>appTo</>
<EntropyMode>mode</>
<ExtraInfo>extra</></>.
Elements <Base>, <STSInfo>, and <AppliesTo> record information on the iden-
tity of the three principals involved: the client, the STS, and the service. We (arbitrar-
ily) record the details of the security tokens identifying the client and the STS, and only
record a URI for the service.
3.4 Other Security Considerations
WS-Trust leaves authorization checks unspecified. They may be performed both at the
STS and the service. For a given system, it is important to document who performs the
checks, and how to interpret the privileges associated with a valid security token.
WS-Trust does not prescribe a particular message flow once the security token has
been established, but (apparently) often assumes a single client will initiate all traffic.
Although each token may typically be associated with a single session between two
endpoints, in principle it may be involved in parallel sessions by multiple processors,
and may be accepted by multiple services. This flexibility can seriously complicate
session management, and replay protection in particular. Also, the web service may
in principle access and use a security context before the client completes the protocol,
with weaker security guarantees. For example, if an attacker has tampered with the
RST, the client will detect the attack once it receives the RSTR, but in the meantime
the service may have proceeded on the basis of the tampered RST.
Regarding privacy, although it is possible to use pseudonyms [19], an eavesdropper
that monitors an exchange may extract detailed information on its participants from the
explicit, semi-structured message format, including for instance their identities, and
sometimes the purpose of the session. Moreover, this information may be signed using
long-term certificates, and thereby provides non-repudiable evidence.
In general, to resist denial-of-service attacks, responders in session establishment
protocols should avoid allocating resources or performing expensive computation until
initiators are authenticated. In our scenario, the web service is reasonably protected
but the STS is open to attack. For example, an attacker may replay messages with
modified elements, leading to expensive (failing) signature verifications. This problem
can be alleviated using several tiers of STSs, or two-round RST/RSTR protocols with
weak authentication in the first round guarding public-key authentication in the second
round.
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Figure 2: Establishing a secure context in entropic mode
4 Modelling and Verifying Uses of WS-Trust
We present our model of a single RST/RSTR exchange, such as the first exchange of
the protocol depicted in Figure 1. The goal of the exchange is to ensure an agreement
on a shared security context. We describe the exchange, detailing our implementation
of principals and the processing of RST and RSTR envelopes, then state our main
theorems for the resulting script, verified using the TulaFale and ProVerif tools.
4.1 Mapping Principals to TulaFale Processes
A normal RST/RSTR exchange consists of two messages exchanged between a client
and an STS process, as depicted in Figure 2. The goal of the exchange is for the two
processes to establish and agree on an SC with a fresh identifier sctid and shared key
sckey. This agreement is achieved in two steps. After the RST message has been
accepted, the client and STS agree on a partial SC, that consists of all the elements
of the SC except <Identifier> and <Key>, which are undetermined at this stage.
After the RSTR message is accepted at the client, both processes agree on the full
established SC. In the rest of this section, we describe how the two processes construct
and check messages to achieve this agreement.
To begin with, both processes know kr, the public key of the CA needed to check
the validity of public key certificates, and share the trusted database of principal secrets.
In our exchange, each envelope embeds a globally unique identifier; its structure is
represented by the predicate uid, and it consists of a freshly generated message identi-
fier, id, and a public timestamp, t.
The process Client in Figure 2 represents an instance of a SOAP client sending
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RSTs and processing RSTRs on behalf of a user. Each run is in one of two operation
modes: either entropic mode, where the client provides entropy for the security context,
or non-entropic mode, where it does not. In either mode, the server provides entropy.
(We do not model a third mode, allowed by the specification, where the client alone
provides entropy.) Figure 2 depicts a typical run in entropic mode. In both modes,
the attacker initializes the client process by sending it a PartialSC that provides the
parameters for a new security context, including the name of the user and the URIs
for the STS and service. The client then retrieves the user record U from the trusted
database (see Section 2) and constructs an RST message corresponding to PartialSC.
A user record contains either a username and password or an X.509 certificate and its
associated private signing key. The RST message has a unique identifier, rstUid, and
in entropic mode, it also contains a fresh client-generated value, clientEntropy.
The process STS represents an STS server. It first retrieves a server principal record
Sts, containing a URL address uriSTS, an X.509 public-key certificate certSTS, and
the associated private signing key skSTS. When it receives an RST, it also retrieves the
principal record U for the client. The trusted database thus represents all authorized
clients of the STS. After checking the RST, the STS process generates a new security
context with fresh identifier sctid and the received parameters PartialSC. It generates
its own stsEntropy and uses it to compute the shared sckey associated with this con-
text. It then returns an RSTR, uniquely identified by rstrUid, containing the sctid and
stsEntropy to the client.
The server entropy in the RSTR, and, in entropic mode, the client entropy in the
RST, are encrypted and then signed, as in the WSE implementation [24].
The intentions of and the agreement between the client and STS are recorded us-
ing begin and end events, as follows. Before sending the RST, the client records its
proposed security context as the event begin C1. After checking the RST, the STS in-
dicates its acceptance of the proposed context as the event end C1. Similarly, before
sending the RSTR, the STS records the established security context as begin C2, and
after checking the received RSTR, the client indicates acceptance of the context with
end C2.
The correspondence assertion C1 after the first message requires that the client and
STS processes agree on the values of the proposed parameters PartialSC, the rstUid,
and the clientEntropy:
C1 = (PartialSC,rstUid,clientEntropy)
Including the rstUid in C1 enables replay detection: if the STS process were to further
ensure that it never accepts two RSTs with the same Uid, then agreement on C1 implies
that each message sent by the client is accepted at most once by the STS process.
The correspondence assertion C2 after the second message requires that the client
and STS processes agree on the full established SC, and the unique identifiers of both
messages (again to enable replay detection).
C2 = (SC,rstUid,rstrUid)
We say that a principal is a client, STS, or server in C1 (or C2) if it is recorded
under the corresponding role in the security context PartialSC (or SC). For instance,
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we say that C1 has a safe client if the principal recorded in the Base field of PartialSC
is safe.
4.2 Processing the RST Envelope
In our exchange, the SOAP envelope that carries the RST has a header consisting of a
message identifier, <To> and <Action> elements designating an STS for issuing an
SCT, and a <Security> element that itself consists of a timestamp, a token identi-
fying the client, and a digital signature. This structure is expressed as a predicate:
predicate envRST(env,rst:item,uriSTS,id,t:string,Sig,BaseToken:item) :−
env = <Envelope>
<Header>
<MessageId>id</>
<To>uriSTS</>
<Action>"RSTSCT"</>
<Security>
<Timestamp><Created>t</></>
BaseToken
Sig</></>
<Body>rst</></>.
The client uses this predicate (and others) to assemble an RST envelope; conversely, the
STS uses this predicate to check that a received envelope complies with this structure,
as a first step of its processing. The full processing for the RST envelope is coded by
the predicate:
predicate isRSTEnvelope(msgrst:item,kr:bytes,U,Sts:item,
PartialSC,rstUid:item,clientEntropy:bytes) :−
envRST(msgrst,rst,uriSTS,id1,t1,sig1,BaseToken),
EntropicRST(rst,srvURI,BaseTokenid,etok,ExtraInfo),
isSTS(Sts,StsInfo,uriSTS,subjSTS,sx,certSTS),
isEncryptedKey(etok,clientEntropy,sx,certSTS),
isX509TokenPub(kr,BaseToken,u,BaseTokenid,ek,certU),
isSignature(sig1,"rsasha1",ek,
[<Body>rst</><To>uriSTS</><Action>"RSTSCT"</>
<MessageId>id1</><Created>t1</>]),
uid(rstUid,id1,t1),
PartialSC(PartialSC,"Both",BaseToken,StsInfo,srvURI,ExtraInfo).
This predicate takes as input the received envelope (msgrst) and checks it using the
public key of the CA (kr) and the principal records for the user (U) and for the STS
(STS). It then extracts as output the proposed context PartialSC, the unique identifier
rstUid, and the received clientEntropy.
The predicate first parses msgrst using envRST, extracting the rst, the relevant
header fields, the message signature sig1, and the user’s authenticating BaseToken.
It then uses isEntropicRST to parse the rst and retrieve etok, which contains the en-
crypted clientEntropy, checking that it contains a fragment URI BaseTokenId pointing
to the user’s BaseToken. The predicate isSTS checks that the STS record Sts has a
uriSTS that matches the <To> header of the RST, and extracts the certificate certSTS
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and private key sx corresponding to the STS. This private key is then used to decrypt
etok to retrieve the clientEntropy. Then, the predicate isX509TokenPub extracts the
user’s public key from BaseToken and the predicate isSignature checks that the cor-
responding private signing key has been used to generate the message signature sig1,
and that sig1 covers the message body and all the parsed header elements. Finally, the
predicates uid and PartialSC construct the outputs rstUid and PartialSC.
Here, we depict the clause used to check an entropic RST signed using a user’s
X.509 public-key certificate. The script contains similar clauses for checking the other
cases, and it defines a symmetric predicate for preparing RST envelopes on the client
side.
4.3 Processing the RSTR Envelope
The SOAP envelope carrying RSTRs has a similar structure to the RST envelope, ex-
pressed in the following predicate:
predicate envRSTR(msgrstr:item,rstr:item,id2:string,t2:string,
STSToken:item,sig2:item,rto:string) :−
msgrstr = <Envelope>
<Header>
<MessageId>id2</><RelatesTo>rto</><Action>"RSTRSCT"</>
<Security>
<Timestamp><Created>t2</></>
STSToken
sig2</></>
<Body>rstr</></>.
The main difference is that the <To> header is replaced with a <RelatesTo> header
that contains the message identifier of the RST being responded to.
Both the creation of RSTRs at the service and the corresponding checks at the client
are again expressed as symmetric predicates. We detail the predicate used by the client
to check entropic RSTRs issued for X.509 user principals:
predicate isEntropicRSTREnvelope(msgrstr:item,kr:bytes,partialSC:item,
rstUid:item,clientEntropy:bytes,
rstrUid:item,sctid:string,stsEntropy:bytes) :−
PartialSC(partialSC,"Both",BaseToken,StsInfo,srvURI,ExtraInfo),
uid(rstUid,rto,t1),
isSTSPubInfo(StsInfo,uriSTS,certSTS),
envRSTR(msgrstr,rstr,id2,t2,STSToken,sig2,rto),
EntropicRSTR(rstr,srvURI,BaseToken,uriSTS,sctid,etok),
isEncryptedKeySym(etok,stsEntropy,clientEntropy),
X509Token(STSToken,certSTS),
isX509Cert(certSTS,kr,subjSTS,"rsasha1",ek),
isSignature(sig2,"rsasha1",ek,
[<Body>rstr</>
<RelatesTo>rto</>
<Action>"RSTRSCT"</>
<MessageId>id2</>
<Created>t2</>]),
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uid(rstrUid,id2,t2).
This predicate takes as input the received RSTR envelope, msgrstr, along with kr and
the PartialSC, rstUid, and clientEntropy received in the RST envelope. It then extracts
as output the unique identifier rstrUid, and the new sctid and stsEntropy generated by
the server.
This predicate uses many clauses similar to those of isRSTEnvelope. It first uses
PartialSC and uid to parse PartialSC and rstUid into their components. and it uses
isSTSPubInfo to extract the URI and certificate of the STS. Then, it parses the re-
ceived envelope using envRSTR, checking that the <RelatesTo> header contains
the message identifier of the RST, and extracting the rstr, STSToken and other head-
ers. The predicate EntropicRSTR parses the rstr, checking that it was issued by the
STS at uriSTS for the user principal identified in BaseToken and for the service at
srvURI, and extracts the sctid and etok containing the encrypted stsEntropy. Then,
isEncryptedDataSym decrypted etok using clientEntropy to extract stsEntropy. Next,
the encryption key of the STS is extracted from the certSTS echoed in STSToken and
isSignature checks that the message signature sig2 was generated with the correspond-
ing private key, and that sig2 covers the rstr and the parsed header elements. Finally,
uid puts together the output rstrUid from the message identifier and timestamp.
4.4 Authentication and Secrecy Results
As described in Section 2, our full TulaFale script models our system as an explicit
pi calculus process consisting of an unbounded number of clients and STSs running
in parallel and willing to communicate over a public channel, under the control of the
attacker. Although the opponent is powerful, our theorems assert that the RST/RSTR
exchange preserves our authentication, correlation, and secrecy goals. The authentica-
tion and correlation goals are stated in terms of the correspondence between begin and
end events generated by client and STS processes; the attacker cannot generate events.
Theorem 1 (Robust Safety of C1, C2) For all runs of the script in the presence of an
active attacker (and hence all choices of operation modes):
• For each end C1 event with a safe client, there is a matching begin C1 event.
• For each end C2 event with a safe client and a safe STS, there is a matching
begin C2 event.
Hence, the exchange guarantees that any RST envelope from a safe client, accepted
by a safe STS, and used to allocate a secure context actually corresponds to a genuine
request with matching parameters.
Secrecy is stated in terms of the attacker’s knowledge of the established session
key.
Theorem 2 (Session-Key Secrecy) For all runs of the script in the presence of an ac-
tive attacker (and hence all choices of operation mode), for each begin C2 with safe
client and STS, the Key element recorded in SC remains secret.
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Hence, even if the service immediately uses the SC key to encrypt messages, only
the client may decrypt those messages. Combining the two theorems, this also holds
once the client issues a matching end C2 and starts using the SC key.
In addition, we have checked that the result holds even if, in entropic mode (that
is, where both client and server provide entropy), one of the participants uses a value
known to the attacker instead of a fresh value as its entropy.
As a corollary, if both the client and the STS are safe and the client completes the
exchange, then the two parties agree on an SC containing a shared, secret key.
These results are automatically proved by running TulaFale on the script listed
in Appendix B.2. In addition to security properties, we also check a series of basic
functional properties, checking for instance that the protocol can successfully complete
for each choice of mode and safe principals.
4.5 Cautionary Notes
As discussed in Section 3.3, properly checking (and correlating) the contents of the
RST and RSTR is critical for reaching our expected agreements. To conclude this
section, we illustrate a few vulnerabilities that occur in variants of our model featuring
weaker enforcement mechanisms.
Suppose the RSTR does not include the client identity (that is, consider omitting
BaseToken from the predicate EntropicRSTR in Section 3.2) and suppose the attacker
has obtained the private key of an unsafe user, sayE. When another (safe) userC sends
a signed RST, E can intercept the envelope, possibly modify its content (for instance
ExtraInfo), and substitute E’s certificate and valid signature for C’s. The STS accepts
the modified message as an RST from E, records E’s identity and ExtraInfo in a new
SC, and sends back a signed RSTR to E. The attacker forwards the RSTR envelope
to C, who accepts it as a valid reply to its original request. Subsequently, messages
sent by C to the service will be accepted and mis-attributed to E. Even if the client
insists on using entropic mode, the attack persists as long as the entropy is encrypted
for the STS before being signed as part of the RST, since the attacker can blindly resign
the encrypted entropy.
Similarly, if the RSTR omits uriSTS, we lose agreement on the URI of the STS.
This may become problematic in case several (safe) STSs sign RSTRs using the same
certificate but enforce different authorization policies.
This difficulty in correlating RST and RSTR messages is a particular instance of a
general problem: the current WS-Security standard [26] does not prescribe any general
mechanism to correlate requests and responses securely. One solution—an IBM/Mi-
crosoft proposal to the WS-Security Technical Committee—involves echoing and sign-
ing (parts of) the signature of the request in the response message. Another solution,
specific to WS-Trust, involves returning alongside the RSTR an “authenticator” hash
of the contents of the RST and RSTR.
5 Web Services Secure Conversation Language
WS-SecureConversation “defines mechanisms for establishing and sharing security
18
contexts, and deriving keys from established security contexts (or any shared secret)”
in order to secure series of messages [20]. We survey the specification, and in particular
focus on the new security tokens it introduces.
5.1 Tokens for Contexts and Key Derivations
WS-SecureConversation introduces two new kinds of security token: SCTs and DKTs.
A security context token (SCT) in the security header of an envelope represents
(an abstract pointer to) a shared security context (SC), typically established using an
RST/RSTR exchange, as described in previous sections. The SCT simply embeds
a context identifier, so that the recipient can access the relevant context, notably the
authenticated identity of the sender. Local references to the SCT can appear in the
envelope whenever a symmetric key is needed, to indicate that the recipient should
read the key from the SC. In our scripts, we use the following structural predicate for
SCTs:
predicate SCT(sct:item,sctid:string):−
sct = <SecurityContextToken><Identifier>sctid</></>.
A derived key token (DKT) provides a reference to a master key, an algorithm, and
additional parameters to compute a separate key. For instance, a typical DKT embeds a
fresh nonce and a reference to an SCT, and indicates that the recipient should compute
a derived key as the hash of that nonce keyed with the SC key. Such DKTs may be
used to secure independent requests relying on the same SC, or to derive distinct keys
for encryption and for authentication.
In our scripts, we use the structural predicate DKSCT to decompose DKTs that
refer to SCTs and the predicate deriveKey to compute the associated key:
predicate DKSCT(dksct:item,sctid:string,nonce:bytes):−
dksct = <DerivedKeyToken>
<SecurityTokenReference>
<Reference>sctid</>
<valueType>"SCT"</></>
<Nonce>base64(nonce)</></>.
predicate deriveKey(dk:bytes,key:bytes,nonce:bytes):−
dk = psha1(base64(nonce),key).
In general, the parent token need not be an SCT; instead one can use, for example, a
Kerberos token, or another DKT. WS-SecureConversation also supports other variants
of key derivation, a lightweight derived-key mechanism that provides the same func-
tionality as a DKT within a key reference, and some SCT propagation and amendment
mechanisms. We do not model these advanced mechanisms in this paper.
5.2 Security Considerations
As advocated in Section 3.3, one should carefully review the intent and usage of se-
curity contexts, especially when they are used to derive authentication materials. Oth-
erwise, a weak (or unauthenticated) agreement may for instance lead to correct but
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ambiguous signatures, which may be misinterpreted by the recipient after an attacker
has rewritten unsigned parts of the envelope.
Unlike fixed protocols, key selection and derivation are dynamically driven by the
tokens included in the envelope; these elements are often unauthenticated or used be-
fore authentication. Thus, even if the recipient can successfully decrypt or validate a
signature using the derived key suggested in the envelope, it is equally important for
this recipient to check that the key is derived from an adequate security token. If the
key is derived from an SCT, for instance, this may involve comparing the target URI
and apparent sender of the envelope to the <AppliesTo> and BaseToken recorded
in the SC.
Despite the terminology, the uniqueness (or freshness) of SC identifiers and derived
key nonces should not be taken for granted, especially when they are passed in the clear.
For instance, a hostile service may eavesdrop an SCT and initiate its own sessions
with the same identifier; this may invalidate the context, or lead to confusion about its
contents.
Finally, although WS-SecureConversation promotes the derivation of a separate key
for each purpose, more efficient keying mechanisms are often available. In the absence
of knowledge of the usage of the keys, it is prudent to generate a fresh key systemati-
cally, as this may prevent interference between cryptographic algorithms. Nonetheless,
for signing a sequence of messages sent by a single client, for example, a key implic-
itly derived from a hash of the session identifier and sequence number is more efficient
than a key derived from a random nonce that additionally signs these two elements.
Besides, for common encryption algorithms, a random initialization vector can play a
role similar to the nonce in a derived key, at a fraction of the cost.
6 Modelling and Verifying Uses of WS-SecureConversation
Continuing with the example of Figure 1, we now consider exchanges between a client
and a service following the completion of an RST/RSTR exchange, as modelled in
Section 4. The security goals of these exchanges are to achieve mutual authentica-
tion between client and service, to ensure message correlation between requests and
responses, and to preserve the secrecy of all message bodies. We first model a single
request/response exchange, before generalizing our results to “open-ended conversa-
tions” comprising arbitrary sequences of exchanges.
A typical run of the protocol is depicted in Figure 3 (but disregard the dashed lines
for now). It involves a process Client that sends a request to a web service using an
existing security context and waits for a response, and a process Service that handles
such requests, for some given address and SOAP action (srvURI,srvAC).
6.1 Mapping Principals to TulaFale Processes
When considering each envelope in this protocol, we use an abstract parameter, DestInfo,
to represent the concatenation of some WS-Addressing [9] headers included in the en-
velope.
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Figure 3: Iterating exchanges
First, the client inputs from the attacker a Request envelope, which provides a se-
curity context identifier sctid, a timestamp t, and target service information srvURI and
srvAC. The client then fetches from the SC database a security context matching sctid,
if any, and completes Request by adding a fresh message identifier and a secret re-
quest body. (Hence, Request is an envelope with some DestInfo that includes headers
containing the request message identifier and target service information.)
In addition, the attacker can also choose between two operation modes: either se-
curing the request with the shared SC key, or securing it with fresh keys derived from
the SC key. These key-derivation details are recorded in an element, RequestMode,
which contains either two nonces used to derive keys for encryption and signature, or
a constant indicating that the SC key is directly used.
As in Section 4, our processes issue events that record their intent: before sending
the request, the client emits begin C3; after receiving the request and checking its
validity, the web service records the acceptance by emitting end C3. These events
record the following data:
C3 = (SC,Request,RequestMode)
After accepting a request from a client, the service similarly prepares a Response
containing a response body and some addressing headers: DestInfo now includes head-
ers echoing the server address srvURI and the request identifier, plus a header contain-
ing a fresh response identifier. For simplicity, the service uses the same operation mode
as the client: if the request used derived keys, so does the response. The corresponding
key derivation details are recorded in ResponseMode.
Before sending its response, the service emits begin C4. After checking the validity
of the response, the client emits end C4. These events record data for both the request
and the response:
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C4 = (C3,Response,ResponseMode)
where C3 includes data on the request, and Response and ResponseMode include data
on the response.
Next, we describe the structure and processing of envelopes that effectively protect
these requests and responses.
6.2 Processing Request and ResponseEnvelopes
Since the request and response envelopes are processed similarly, we use generic pred-
icates for both purposes. When using derived keys, the structure of these SOAP en-
velopes is given by the predicate:
predicate env(Env:item,DestInfo:items,t:string,sig,ebody:item,
sctid:string,mode:item) :−
Env = <Envelope>
<Header>
<Security>
<Timestamp><Created>t</></>
sct dksctEnc dksctSig
sig</> @
DestInfo </>
<Body>ebody</></>,
SCT(sct,sctid),
DKSCT(dksctEnc,sctid,EncNonce), DKSCT(dksctSig,sctid,SigNonce),
derivedKeyMode(mode,EncNonce,SigNonce).
The structure of the envelope is similar to those defined in Section 4.2, with three
main differences: The envelope now includes a security context token (sct) and two
derived key tokens (dksctEnc and dksctSig) used to indicate keys for encryption and
signing. The envelope also includes a generic parameter DestInfo that provides headers
specific to requests and responses. Finally, the envelope includes an encrypted body
(ebody).
After setting the structure of the envelope, the env predicate inspects the SCT and
DKTs, in order to return an SC identifier (sctid) and a mode descriptor embedding the
two nonces used for key derivation (EncNonce and SigNonce).
We now give a predicate used for validating incoming envelopes: requests for the
service, and responses for the client.
predicate isEnv(Env:item,EnvelopeInfo:item,SC:item,mode:item) :−
env(Env,DestInfo,t,sig,ebody,sctid,mode),
SC(SC,sctid,sckey,entropyMode,UserToken,StsInfo,appTo,extra),
computeKeys(mode,sckey,EncKey,SigKey),
isEncryptedDataSym(ebody,b,EncKey),
EnvInfo(EnvelopeInfo,t,sctid,DestInfo,b),
isSignature(sig,"hmacsha1",SigKey,
[<Body>ebody</> <Created>t</> @ DestInfo ]).
In the predicate, env parses the envelope, extracting DestInfo and other sub-elements.
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When processing a request, DestInfo contains information about the web service
URI and desired action, along with a message identifier. This is checked by the predi-
cate:
predicate destInfoReq(DestInfo:items,srvURI:item,srvAC:item,id1:string):−
DestInfo = [<To>srvURI</> <Action>srvAC</> <MessageId>id1</>].
When processing a response, DestInfo contains the web service URI as source infor-
mation, plus a message identifier and the original request message identifier, used for
correlation.
predicate destInfoResp(DestInfoResponse:items,srvURI:item,id1:string,id2:string):−
DestInfoResponse = [<From>srvURI</> <RelatesTo>id1</> <MessageId>id2</>].
The call to env also extracts timestamp t, signature sig an encrypted body ebody,
security context identifier sctid and operation mode.
Next, predicate SC checks sctid against the security context SC and then retrieves
the security context key sckey. Predicate computeKeys uses that key and the two
nonces passed in mode to compute the keys EncKey and SigKey protecting the en-
velope, as explained in Section 5.1. EncKey is then used to decrypt the message body,
whereas SignKey is used to verify a signature binding the encrypted message body, a
timestamp, and the addressing headers. Finally, information extracted from the enve-
lope is returned in EnvelopeInfo.
6.3 Authentication and Secrecy Results
The following theorem establishes the agreement, message correlation, and secrecy
properties for the exchange described above:
Theorem 3 (Robust Safety of C3, C4 and Secrecy) For all runs of the script in the
presence of an active attacker (and hence all choices of operation modes):
• For each end C3 with a safe security context, there is a matching begin C3.
• For each end C4 with a safe security context, there is a matching begin C4.
• For each exchange with a safe security context, the request and response bodies
are kept secret.
The proof is obtained by running TulaFale on the script listed in Appendix B.4.
6.4 Open-Ended Conversations
We now extend our protocol to allow clients and services to iterate their exchanges—as
suggested by the dashed lines of Figure 3—thus modelling a more substantial conver-
sation. For simplicity, we fix the operation mode and always use derived keys.
Each session is identified by sessionId, freshly generated by the client before send-
ing its first request. Each request within the session is indexed by a sequence number.
To this end, we (mostly) comply with the syntax of WS-ReliableMessaging [13] and
use its simple request acknowledgment mechanism: requests carry a <Sequence>
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header, including the sessionId and a message number n, set to zero by the client in the
first request, and incremented by one in every subsequent request. The structure of this
header is given by the predicate:
predicate sequence(Sequence:item,sessionId:string,msgNumber:bytes):−
Sequence = <Sequence>
<Identifier>sessionId</>
<MessageNumber>base64(msgNumber)</></>.
Similarly, responses carry a <SequenceAcknowledgement> header echoing the
received sessionId and message number.
To specify an agreement on the conversation as a whole, our client and service
collect detailed information in events, as follows.
For the n-th request and response, respectively, C3n and C4n record not only the
envelope just sent (for begin events) or accepted (for end events), but also the preceding
sequence of all previously-processed envelopes for the session, and their shared session
identifier sessionId and security context SC (which provides in particular client and
service identification).
C3n = (SC,sessionId,Req0,Resp0, . . . ,Reqn)
C4n = (SC,sessionId,Req0,Resp0, . . . ,Reqn,Respn)
To establish the correspondences, we use a script that protects the service from
replays of initial requests with identical session identifiers. (This is necessary because
the server does not contribute to the generation of the session identifier, and thus could
be lead to run several sessions for a single client session.)
Theorem 4 (Robust Safety of C3n, C4n and Secrecy) For all runs of the script in
the presence of an active attacker (and hence all choices of operation modes), and
for all n ≥ 0, we have:
• For each end C3n with a safe security context, there is a matching begin C3n.
• For each end C4n with a safe security context, there is a matching begin C4n.
• All request and response bodies protected by a safe security context remain se-
cret.
The proof is shown in Appendix A, while the script for our iterated protocol is listed in
Appendix B.5.
The theorem is obtained by running ProVerif on a similar, but slightly more abstract
script, in which sequencing is also controlled by the environment. We then manually
carry over the properties from one script to another, relying on standard equivalences
in the pi calculus [2].
6.5 Cautionary Notes
As in Section 4.5, we mention some attacks observed as we modelled weaker variants
of the protocol.
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Upon receiving a message secured using SCTs, it is important to attribute the mes-
sage to the correct sending principal, typically by verifying that the message is signed
and encrypted using keys derived from the same SC. Conversely, envelopes with mul-
tiple SCTs are often problematic. Consider, for instance, a web server that attributes
the message to the principal associated with the first SCT in the security header. Then,
an attacker can intercept a message protected (that is, signed or encrypted) using an
SCT, and can rewrite it by inserting a different SCT at the beginning of the security
header. Assuming both SCTs are associated with valid SCs for the same service but
for different clients, the service will accept the rewritten request and attribute it to the
wrong client. Consider now a web server that attributes the message to the principal
associated with the encrypting SCT, but accepts messages signed with a different SCT.
Then, if the attacker knows the secret stored in an (unsafe) SC, it can impersonate any
sender using a (safe) SC, by intercepting, modifying and re-signing its messages.
Concerning open-ended conversations using WS-ReliableMessaging, as illustrated
in Section 6.4, the current specification makes it necessary to enforce replay protection
for initial client requests. This contrasts with a common pattern in protocols, whereby
the first request has no effect on the server, and thus replays are considered harmless
in the first exchange. Besides, replay protection is hard to implement for web server
farms, where several servers share the same SOAP address and STS.
Without replay protection, a subtle “session replication” attack appears when the
same initial client request can be accepted several times. Starting from the first request,
an attacker can systematically replicate each request towards n server instances of the
session, forward one selected response to the client, and discard the other responses. As
soon as some of the responses differ, some instances of the server will accept requests
that do not correspond to their previous responses.
7 Related Work
There has been great recent progress in formalisms and tools for the Dolev-Yao model,
but protocols of the level of complexity considered here have only recently come within
the reach of formal methods. We mention two roughly comparable examples.
Paulson [28] shows authentication, secrecy, and integrity properties of a model
of the SSL/TLS protocol with the interactive prover Isabelle; Paulson’s was the first
formal study of SSL/TLS to put no finite bounds on the numbers of principals or con-
current sessions—an assumption made in earlier approaches using model-checking.
More recently, Abadi, Blanchet, and Fournet [1] show various security properties
of the JFK key establishment protocol using ProVerif [7, 8]. ProVerif needs little user
interaction compared to Isabelle, and also supports unbounded models of the protocol.
There are by now many implementations of SOAP and XML security, but there
is comparatively little work on formalizing the resulting security properties. Damiani
et al [10] show access control properties for SOAP-based web services, relying on an
underlying secure channel such as SSL/TLS. Gordon and Pucella [15] prove authenti-
cation properties of SOAP-based security protocols, but do not consider key establish-
ment and do not model XML syntax in detail. Kleiner and Roscoe [22] extract abstract
descriptions of some simple WS-Security protocols from XML message sequences.
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These descriptions are intended for finite-state analysis with the FDR model checker,
although in principle many tools for the Dolev-Yao model may be applicable.
Other formal work on web services protocols includes a model of Atomic Transac-
tion [18].
8 Conclusions
Our study complements the ongoing work to author and refine the WS-Trust and
WS-SecureConversation specifications, to develop implementations, and to test con-
formance at interoperability workshops. Our positive results concerning secrecy and
authenticity within a formal threat model increase confidence in particular usages of the
specifications. On the other hand, our negative results for other usages reveal potential
vulnerabilities and suggest corrections or guidance.
We believe our formal approach can be an asset to the community during the stan-
dardization process, as we can swiftly verify security properties of particular proposals.
For example, it took only a few hours to adapt the scripts of this paper to model and
check properties of the protocol used at the WS-Trust and WS-SecureConversation
interoperability workshop [31].
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A Proof Sketch for Theorem 4
In this section we refer to the script reported in Appendix B.5 as SN . Abstractly, the
client process in SN behaves as follows:
new sessionDb;
C[
new sessionId:string;
out sessionDb(emptyHistory,sessionId,zero()))
][
!in sessionDb(History,sessionId,msgNumber);
...(linear)...;
begin C3 (History.Mreq,msgNumber,sessionId);
...(linear)...;
end C4 (History.Mreq.Mresp,msgNumber,sessionId);
out sessionDb(newHistory,sessionId,succ(msgNumber)).
]
C[ ] denotes an (arbitrary) context in which the script is being run. Initially, the
client creates a sessionDb channel, that is going to be used by the session to keep
state after every exchange. Then the client creates a fresh sessionId, and finally enters
a loop, where in each iteration a subsequent exchange is performed. In the script,
emptyHistory is the empty tuple, while History contains the previous exchanges. Next
we show the behaviour of the service, in which as a simplification we input the new
sessionId directly from the attacker (since, in any case, the sessionId is sent in the clear
in the first message):
new sessionDbS;
C[
in attacker(sessionId);
out sessionDbS(emptyHistory,sessionId,zero()))
][
!in sessionDbS(History,sessionId,msgNumber);
...(linear)...;
end C3 (History.Mreq,msgNumber,sessionId);
...(linear)...;
begin C4 (History.Mreq.Mresp,msgNumber,sessionId);
out sessionDbS(newHistory,sessionId,succ(msgNumber)).
]
where attacker is a public channel in control of the attacker.
We code a similar but more abstract script SA. The script is presented in Appendix
B.6. TulaFale terminates rapidly on SA (within about twenty minutes) but appears to
diverge on SN . In SA, the client behaves as follows:
new sessionDb;
C[
new sessionId:string;
out sessionDb(sessionId)
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][
!in sessionDb(sessionId)
in attacker(msgNumber);
...(linear)...;
begin C3 (Mreq,msgNumber,sessionId);
...(linear)...;
end C4 (Mresp,msgNumber,sessionId);
out sessionDb(sessionId).
]
The service is coded similarly:
new sessionDbS;
C[
in attacker(sessionId);
out sessionDbS(sessionId))
][
!in sessionDbS(sessionId);
in attacker(msgNumber);
...(linear)...;
end C3 (Mreq,msgNumber,sessionId);
...(linear)...;
begin C4 (Mresp,msgNumber,sessionId);
out sessionDbS(sessionId).
]
Intuitively, SN and SA differ on the fact that SA inputs msgNumber directly from
the attacker, while SN uses built-in integers. Also, SA does not record the whole
conversation but only the last request, whereas SN records all the previously exchanged
requests and responses. Besides these two differences, SN and SA are identical.
In fact, in script SN , C3 and C4 are very similar: C4 only differs from C3 in that it
adds the last response to the recorded conversation. To simplify notation, we can then
fuse C3 and C4 into a unique correspondence C, indexed by n, and unifying requests
and responses simply as messages M:
Cn = (sessionId,M0, ...,Mn)
So, for example, the first event begin C3 (Mreq0,0,sessionId) corresponds to event
begin C0 =(sessionId,M0), while the first begin C4 (Mreq0.Mresp0,0,sessionId) cor-
responds to begin C1 =(sessionId,M0,M1).
Also notice that, for n > 0, we can decompose Cn as Cn =Cn−1.Mn.
For our script SA, we have a weaker correspondence, which records only the last
message:
CAn = (sessionId,Mn)
As a consequence of the fact that SN and SA are identical, we obtain that whenever
an event (begin or end) Cn is recorded in an execution of SN , a corresponding event
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(begin or end) CAn is recorded in a corresponding execution of SA. This is established
in the following Lemma:
Lemma 1 (Same events) For the scripts SN and SA it holds:
1. For every reduction of SN into TN , there exists TA and a corresponding reduc-
tion of SA into TA s.t. every recorded event begin or end Cn =(sessionId,M0, ...,Mn)
has a corresponding recorded event begin or end CAn =(sessionId,Mn).
2. For every reduction of SA into TA, there exists TN and a corresponding reduc-
tion of SN into TN s.t. every recorded event begin or end CAn =(sessionId,Mn)
has a corresponding recorded event begin or end Cn(sessionId,M’0, ...,M’n,Mn)
for some M’i, i ∈ [0..n− 1].
This follows from inspection of the scripts SN and SA, where every action and
event action is identical, except the (above mentioned) difference, which does not in-
fluence the behaviour of the scripts (SA has only an extra input from the environment).
By looking on the scripts, we also obtain the following useful lemma:
Lemma 2 (Script Structure) In SN , for n ≥ 1:
1. each time an end Cn (end CAn ) is recorded, then begin Cn−1 (begin CAn−1) is
also recorded.
2. each time an begin Cn (begin CAn ) is recorded, then end Cn−1 (end CAn−1) is
also recorded.
The next lemma establishes the correspondence in SA:
Lemma 3 (TF) In SA, end CAn implies begin CAn .
This is established by running ProVerif on script SA.
Inspecting the script SN we deduce that, for every n ≥ 1, each begin and end
event C is recorded at most once:
Lemma 4 (Linearity By Shape) In SN , for n ≥ 1, pairs (sessionId, n) index all C
events.
For n = 0, we know that there is only one begin C0 (since sessionId is always
generated fresh), but there may be more than one end C0 (since the first request may
be replayed several times, see Section 6.4, paragraph before statement of Theorem 4).
To establish Theorem 4, we need to require the uniqueness of end C0 by coding an
anti-replay cache on the service code in SN .
We are now ready to prove the following theorem, which establishes Theorem 4.
Theorem 5 (Robust Safety for Cn) For all runs of the script SN with the service hav-
ing an anti-replay cache for the initial request, in the presence of an active attacker,
and for all n ≥ 0, we have that for each end Cn with a safe security context, there is a
matching begin Cn. Furthermore, all request and response bodies protected by a safe
security context remain secret.
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Proof. The last part of the theorem, regarding secrecy of the request and response
bodies, can be established by running ProVerif over SA (as listed in Appendix B.6),
checking secrecy. Since both scripts are identical except an input of the msgNumber,
we conclude that secrecy of the request and response bodies in SA implies also secrecy
of the request and response bodies in SN .
Now we consider the first part of the theorem, regarding correspondences. We
proceed by induction on n. For n = 0, we have that Cn =CAn , and then by Lemma 3
we obtain the result. Now take n > 0. Applying Lemma 2(1) to end Cn, we obtain
that event begin Cn−1 was recorded, with Cn =Cn−1.Mn.
Now consider again end Cn. Applying Lemma 1(1), we know that there is a
corresponding event end CAn in SA. By Lemma 3, we obtain the recorded event
begin CAn in SA. Applying Lemma 1 (2), we know that there must be a recorded
event begin C’n−1Mn for some C’n−1.
By Lemma 2(2), we obtain end C’n−1. By inductive hypothesis, we obtain begin C’n−1.
Now, note that C’n−1 shares the same sessionId with Cn−1. If n = 1, then by hy-
pothesis there is only one event end C0 with the same sessionId, thus C0 = C’0. If
n > 1, then by Lemma 4 we again obtain that Cn−1 = C’n−1. This implies that
begin C’n−1Mn =begin Cn−1Mn = begin Cn, establishing the theorem.
B Scripts
B.1 Common Predicates and Processes
// Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
// common.tf−Model of Trust/SecureConversation
predicate mkRefs(ts:items,rs:items) :−
ts = [t1 t2 t3],
mkRef(t1,r1),
mkRef(t2,r2),
mkRef(t3,r3),
rs = [r1 r2 r3].
predicate isRefs(ts:items,rs:items) :−
ts = [t1 t2 t3],
rs = [r1 r2 r3],
ref(t1,r1),
ref(t2,r2),
ref(t3,r3).
// =============================
// Data structure to represent a service identity
predicate isService(S:item,uri:item,ac:item) :−
S = <Service><To>uri</> <Action>ac</></>.
// same as in library but with Identifier
predicate isUsernameToken (tok:item,U:item,id:string,n:bytes,t:string,k:bytes,u:string) :−
isUser(U,u,pwd),
tok = <UsernameToken wsuId=id>
<Username> u </>
<Nonce> base64(n) </>
<Created> t </> </>,
k = psha1(pwd,concat(n,utf8(t))).
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// symmetric encryption
predicate isEncryptedDataSym (encrypted:item,plain:item,k:bytes) :−
encrypted = <EncryptedData><CipherData><CipherValue>base64(cipher)</></></>,
c14n(plain) = decaes(k,cipher).
predicate mkEncryptedDataSym (encrypted:item,plain:item,k:bytes) :−
cipher = aes(k,c14n(plain)),
encrypted = <EncryptedData><CipherData><CipherValue>base64(cipher)</></></>.
// symmetric key encryption
predicate isEncryptedKeySym (encrypted:item,plain:bytes,k:bytes) :−
encrypted = <EncryptedKey><CipherData><CipherValue>base64(cipher)</></></>,
plain = decaes(k,cipher).
predicate mkEncryptedKeySym (encrypted:item,plain:bytes,k:bytes) :−
cipher = aes(k,plain),
encrypted = <EncryptedKey><CipherData><CipherValue>base64(cipher)</></></>.
predicate isEncryptedKey (encrypted:item,plain:bytes,dk:bytes,cert:bytes) :−
encrypted = <EncryptedKey>
<CipherData><CipherValue>base64(cipher)</></>
<Key><BinarySecurityToken>base64(cert)</></></>,
plain = decrsa(dk,cipher).
predicate mkEncryptedKey (encrypted:item,plain:bytes,ek:bytes,cert:bytes) :−
cipher = rsa(ek,plain),
encrypted = <EncryptedKey>
<CipherData><CipherValue>base64(cipher)</></>
<Key><BinarySecurityToken>base64(cert)</></></>.
// =====================================
// <SecurityContextToken>− reference to a SecurityContext
// <SecurityContext>− actual shared context−−
// WS−specific, reflecting class
predicate PartialSC(sd:item,mode:string,UserToken:item,StsInfo:item,appTo:string,extra:item) :−
sd = <SecurityContext>
<Base>UserToken</>
<STSInfo>StsInfo</>
<AppliesTo>appTo</>
<EntropyMode>mode</>
<ExtraInfo>extra</>
</>.
predicate remCertPartialSC(partialSC:item,remCertSC:item) :−
PartialSC(partialSC,mode,UserToken,StsInfo,appTo,extra),
isSTSPubInfo(StsInfo,uriSTS,certSTS),
remCertSC = <SecurityContext>
<Base>UserToken</>
<STSUri>uriSTS</> // in WSE impl, URI only, here includes a binarysecurity token containing STS cert
<AppliesTo>appTo</>
<EntropyMode>mode</>
<ExtraInfo>extra</>
</>.
predicate SC(SC:item,sctid:string,sckey:bytes,mode:string,
UserToken,StsInfo:item,appTo:string,extra:item) :−
SC = <SecurityContext>
<Identifier>sctid</>
<Key>base64(sckey)</>
<Base>UserToken</>
<STSInfo>StsInfo</>
<AppliesTo>appTo</>
<EntropyMode>mode</>
<ExtraInfo>extra</></>.
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predicate fillSC(sc:item,partialsc:item,sctid:string,sctkey:bytes) :−
PartialSC(partialsc,mode,UserToken,StsInfo,appTo,extra),
SC(sc,sctid,sctkey,mode,UserToken,StsInfo,appTo,extra).
predicate X509Token (tok:item,cert:bytes) :−
tok = <BinarySecurityToken ValueType="X509v3"> base64(cert) </>.
predicate isX509TokenId (kr:bytes,tok:item,U:item,u:string,id:string,sk:bytes,certU:bytes) :−
isX509User(U,u,sk,certU,kr),
tok = <X509Token wsuId=id>
<BinarySecurityToken>
base64(certU)
</>
</>.
predicate isPrincipal(tok:item, u:string) :−
tok = <X509Token wsuId=id>
<BinarySecurityToken>
base64(certU)
</>
</>,
u = x509user(certU).
predicate isPrincipal(tok:item, u:string) :−
tok = <UsernameToken wsuId=id>
<Username> u </>
<Nonce> base64(n) </>
<Created> t </> </>.
predicate isX509TokenPub (kr:bytes,tok:item,u:string,id:string,ek:bytes,certU:bytes) :−
tok = <X509Token wsuId=id>
<BinarySecurityToken>
base64(certU)
</>
</>,
isX509Cert(certU,kr,u,"rsasha1",ek).
predicate mkX509User (U:item,u:string,sk:bytes,xcert:bytes,sr:bytes) :−
xcert = x509(sr,u,"rsasha1",pk(sk)),
U = <User><Username>u</><Cert>base64(xcert)</><Sk>base64(sk)</></>.
predicate isX509User (U:item,u:string,sk:bytes,xcert:bytes,kr:bytes) :−
U = <User><Username>u</><Cert>base64(xcert)</><Sk>base64(sk)</></>,
isX509Cert(xcert,kr,u,"rsasha1",pk(sk)).
// ==================================
// Generate fresh username/password combination
channel genUser(string).
channel leakUser(string).
private channel anyUser(item).
event LeakUser(string).
process MkUser() =
in genUser(u);
new pwd:string;
filter isUser(U,u,pwd)→U;
!out anyUser (U).
process MkUserLeak(kr:bytes) =
in leakUser(u);
in anyUser(U);
event LeakUser(u);
((filter isUser(U,u,pwd)→ pwd;
out publish(pwd)) |
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(filter isX509User(U,u,sk,xcert,kr)→ sk,xcert;
out publish(base64(sk)))).
channel genUserCert(string).
process MkUserCert(sr:bytes) =
in genUserCert(u);
new sk:bytes;
filter mkX509User(U,u,sk,xcert,sr)→U,xcert;
out publish (base64(xcert));
!out anyUser (U).
// ================================
// Relates STS with a specific cert; the attacker can choose the details
// of a STS, but not their certs
// ==============================
// Data structure to represent a token server
predicate isSTSPubInfo(S:item,uri:string,cert:bytes) :−
S = <STS><To>uri</><BinarySecurityToken>base64(cert)</></>.
predicate isSTSInfo(S:item,uri:string,subj:string,ek:bytes,cert:bytes) :−
S = <STS><To>uri</><BinarySecurityToken>base64(cert)</></>,
subj = x509user(cert),
ek = x509key(cert).
predicate isSTSPrivInfo(S:item,StsInfo:item,sx:bytes) :−
S = <STSPriv>
StsInfo
<PrivateSigningKey>base64(sx)</>
</>,
isSTSPubInfo(StsInfo,uri,cert),
pk(sx) = x509key(cert).
predicate isSTS(S:item,StsInfo:item,uri:string,subj:string,sk:bytes,cert:bytes) :−
isSTSPrivInfo(S,StsInfo,sk),
isSTSInfo(StsInfo,uri,subj,pk(sk),cert).
predicate uid(uid:item, id:string, t:string) :−
uid = <Uid>id t</>.
// ==================================
// Generate fresh principals, with username/password or X.509 certs
channel genPrincipal(string).
channel leakPrincipal(string).
private channel anyPrincipal(item).
event LeakPrincipal(string).
process MkPrincipal() =
in genPrincipal(u);
new pwd:string;
filter isUser(U,u,pwd)→U;
!out anyPrincipal (U).
channel genPrincipalCert(string).
process MkPrincipalCert(sr:bytes) =
in genPrincipalCert(u);
new sk:bytes;
filter mkX509User(U,u,sk,xcert,sr)→U,xcert;
out publish (base64(xcert));
!out anyPrincipal (U).
process MkPrincipalLeak(kr:bytes) =
in leakPrincipal(u);
in anyPrincipal(U);
event LeakPrincipal(u);
((filter isUser(U,u,pwd)→ pwd;
out publish(pwd)) |
(filter isX509User(U,u,sk,xcert,kr)→ sk,xcert;
out publish(base64(sk)))).
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channel genSTS(item).
private channel anySTS(item).
process MkSTS(kr:bytes) =
in genSTS(S);
filter isSTSPubInfo(S,uri,cert) → uri,cert;
in anyPrincipal(U);
filter isX509User(U,u,sx,cert,kr)→ u,sx;
filter isSTSPrivInfo(StsPriv,S,sx) → StsPriv;
!out anySTS(StsPriv).
predicate SCT(sct:item,sctid:string):−
sct = <SecurityContextToken><Identifier>sctid</></>.
B.2 Authentication and Secrecy for WS-Trust (Theorems 1 and 2)
B.2.1 WS-Trust: Main Processes
// Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
// wstrust.tf−Model of Trust/SecureConversation
// Part 1: SC establishment, RST/RSTR exchange
// see WS−Trust spec 1.1 May 2004
// This file contains predicates to create envelopes for messages RST/RSTR.
constructor undef():bytes.
// ==============================
// RST template
// Client provides entropy Case
// with ExtraInfo for arbitrary extensions (Lifetime...) added by Ricardo
predicate EntropicRST(rst:item,srvURI,ref:string,etok,ExtraInfo:item):−
rst = <RequestSecurityToken>
<TokenType>"SecurityContextToken"</>
<RequestType>"Issue"</>
<AppliesTo><EndpointReference>srvURI</></>
<Base><SecurityTokenReference>ref</></>
<Entropy>etok </>
ExtraInfo
</>.
// Client does NOT provide entropy Case
predicate NonEntropicRST(rst:item,srvURI:string,ref:string,ExtraInfo:item):−
rst = <RequestSecurityToken>
<TokenType>"SecurityContextToken"</>
<RequestType>"Issue"</>
<AppliesTo><EndpointReference>srvURI</></>
<Base><SecurityTokenReference>ref</></>
ExtraInfo
</>.
// ================================
// Envelope template for RST SCT
// (omitted ReplyTo)
predicate envRST(env,rst:item,uriSTS,id,t:string,Sig,BaseToken:item) :−
env = <Envelope>
<Header>
<MessageId>id</>
<To>uriSTS</>
<Action>"RSTSCT"</>
<Security>
<Timestamp><Created>t</></>
BaseToken
Sig</></>
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<Body>rst</></>.
// ==================================
// Make Message RST
// Four cases arising from entropyMode={Both,Server}, and algorithm={hmacsha1,rsasha1} (client using Username token or X509)
predicate mkEntropicRSTEnvelope(msgrst:item,kr:bytes,U:item,partialSC:item,
rstUid:item,clientEntropy:bytes) :−
PartialSC(partialSC,"Both",BaseToken,StsInfo,srvURI,ExtraInfo),
uid(rstUid,id1,t1),
isSTSPubInfo(StsInfo,uriSTS,certSTS),
isX509Cert(certSTS,kr,subjSTS,"rsasha1",ek),
mkEncryptedKey(etok,clientEntropy,ek,certSTS),
isUsernameToken(BaseToken,U,BaseTokenid,utokN,utokTS,sk,u),
EntropicRST(rst,srvURI,BaseTokenid,etok,ExtraInfo),
mkSignature(sig1,"hmacsha1",sk,
[<Body>rst</>
<To>uriSTS</>
<Action>"RSTSCT"</>
<MessageId>id1</>
<Created>t1</>]),
envRST(msgrst,rst,uriSTS,id1,t1,sig1,BaseToken).
predicate mkEntropicRSTEnvelope(msgrst:item,kr:bytes,U:item,
partialSC:item,rstUid:item,clientEntropy:bytes) :−
PartialSC(partialSC,"Both",BaseToken,StsInfo,srvURI,ExtraInfo),
uid(rstUid,id1,t1),
isSTSPubInfo(StsInfo,uriSTS,certSTS),
isX509Cert(certSTS,kr,subjSTS,"rsasha1",ek),
mkEncryptedKey(etok,clientEntropy,ek,certSTS),
isX509TokenId(kr,BaseToken,U,u,BaseTokenid,sk,certU),
EntropicRST(rst,srvURI,BaseTokenid,etok,ExtraInfo),
mkSignature(sig1,"rsasha1",sk,
[<Body>rst</>
<To>uriSTS</>
<Action>"RSTSCT"</>
<MessageId>id1</>
<Created>t1</>]),
envRST(msgrst,rst,uriSTS,id1,t1,sig1,BaseToken).
predicate mkNonEntropicRSTEnvelope(msgrst:item,kr:bytes,U:item,partialSC:item,rstUid:item) :−
PartialSC(partialSC,"Server",BaseToken,StsInfo,srvURI,ExtraInfo),
uid(rstUid,id1,t1),
isSTSPubInfo(StsInfo,uriSTS,certSTS),
isX509Cert(certSTS,kr,subjSTS,"rsasha1",ek),
isX509TokenId(kr,BaseToken,U,u,BaseTokenid,sk,certU),
NonEntropicRST(rst,srvURI,BaseTokenid,ExtraInfo),
mkSignature(sig1,"rsasha1",sk,
[ <Body>rst</>
<To>uriSTS</>
<Action>"RSTSCT"</>
<MessageId>id1</>
<Created>t1</>]),
envRST(msgrst,rst,uriSTS,id1,t1,sig1,BaseToken).
// ================================
// Check Message RST
predicate isRSTEnvelope(msgrst:item,kr:bytes,U:item,Sts:item,
PartialSC:item,rstUid:item,clientEntropy:bytes) :−
envRST(msgrst,rst,uriSTS,id1,t1,sig1,BaseToken),
EntropicRST(rst,srvURI,BaseTokenid,etok,ExtraInfo),
isSTS(Sts,StsInfo,uriSTS,subjSTS,sx,certSTS),
isEncryptedKey(etok,clientEntropy,sx,certSTS),
isUsernameToken(BaseToken,U,BaseTokenid,n,t,sk,u),
isSignature(sig1,"hmacsha1",sk,[<Body>rst</><To>uriSTS</><Action>"RSTSCT"</>
<MessageId>id1</><Created>t1</>]),
uid(rstUid,id1,t1),
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PartialSC(PartialSC,"Both",BaseToken,StsInfo,srvURI,ExtraInfo).
predicate isRSTEnvelope(msgrst:item,kr:bytes,U,Sts:item,
PartialSC,rstUid:item,clientEntropy:bytes) :−
envRST(msgrst,rst,uriSTS,id1,t1,sig1,BaseToken),
EntropicRST(rst,srvURI,BaseTokenid,etok,ExtraInfo),
isSTS(Sts,StsInfo,uriSTS,subjSTS,sx,certSTS),
isEncryptedKey(etok,clientEntropy,sx,certSTS),
isX509TokenPub(kr,BaseToken,u,BaseTokenid,ek,certU),
isSignature(sig1,"rsasha1",ek,
[<Body>rst</><To>uriSTS</><Action>"RSTSCT"</>
<MessageId>id1</><Created>t1</>]),
uid(rstUid,id1,t1),
PartialSC(PartialSC,"Both",BaseToken,StsInfo,srvURI,ExtraInfo).
predicate isRSTEnvelope(msgrst:item,kr:bytes,U:item,Sts:item,
partialSC:item,rstUid:item,clientEntropy:bytes) :−
envRST(msgrst,rst,uriSTS,id1,t1,sig1,BaseToken),
uid(rstUid,id1,t1),
NonEntropicRST(rst,srvURI,BaseTokenid,ExtraInfo),
clientEntropy=utf8("zero"),
isSTS(Sts,StsInfo,uriSTS,subjSTS,sx,certSTS),
isX509TokenPub(kr,BaseToken,u,BaseTokenid,ek,certU),
isSignature(sig1,"rsasha1",ek,
[<Body>rst</>
<To>uriSTS</>
<Action>"RSTSCT"</>
<MessageId>id1</>
<Created>t1</>]),
PartialSC(partialSC,"Server",BaseToken,StsInfo,srvURI,ExtraInfo).
// ===============================
// RSTR request response template
// Entropy case
predicate EntropicRSTR(rstr:item,srvURI:string,BaseToken:item,
uriSTS:string,sctid:string,etok:item):−
rstr = <RequestSecurityTokenResponse>
<AppliesTo><EndpointReference>srvURI</></>
<RequestedSecurityToken>
<SecurityContextToken>
<Identifier>sctid</></></>
<Entropy>etok </>
<RequestInfo>
BaseToken
uriSTS </>
</>.
// No Entropy case
predicate NonEntropicRSTR(rstr:item,srvURI:string,BaseToken:item,uriSTS:string,sctid:string,etok:item):−
rstr = <RequestSecurityTokenResponse>
<AppliesTo><EndpointReference>srvURI</></>
<RequestedSecurityToken>
<SecurityContextToken>
<Identifier>sctid</></></>
<RequestedProofToken>
etok </>
<RequestInfo>
BaseToken
uriSTS </>
</>.
// ===============================
// Envelope template for RSTR SCT
//
predicate envRSTR(msgrstr:item,rstr:item,id2:string,t2:string,
STSToken:item,sig2:item,rto:string) :−
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msgrstr = <Envelope>
<Header>
<MessageId>id2</><RelatesTo>rto</><Action>"RSTRSCT"</>
<Security>
<Timestamp><Created>t2</></>
STSToken
sig2</></>
<Body>rstr</></>.
// ==============================
// Make Message RSTR
// Entropy case
// Ricardo: <AddedInfo> added to get agreement. NOT present in the wse−samples
predicate mkEntropicRSTREnvelope(msgrstr:item,kr:bytes,Sts:item,
partialSC:item,rstUid:item,clientEntropy:bytes,
rstrUid:item,sctid:string,stsEntropy:bytes) :−
PartialSC(partialSC,"Both",BaseToken,StsInfo,srvURI,ExtraInfo),
uid(rstUid,rto,t1),
uid(rstrUid,id2,t2),
isSTS(Sts,StsInfo,uriSTS,subjSTS,sx,certSTS),
mkEncryptedKeySym(etok,stsEntropy,clientEntropy),
EntropicRSTR(rstr,srvURI,BaseToken,uriSTS,sctid,etok),
X509Token(STSToken,certSTS),
mkSignature(sig2,"rsasha1",sx,
[<Body>rstr</>
<RelatesTo>rto</>
<Action>"RSTRSCT"</>
<MessageId>id2</>
<Created>t2</>]),
envRSTR(msgrstr,rstr,id2,t2,STSToken,sig2,rto).
// No entropy case
// Ricardo’s choice: entropyMode="no" only allowed when requestor is using x509 cert
predicate mkNonEntropicRSTREnvelope(msgrstr:item,kr:bytes,Sts:item,partialSC:item,
rstUid:item,rstrUid:item,sctid:string,stsEntropy:bytes) :−
PartialSC(partialSC,"Server",BaseToken,StsInfo,srvURI,ExtraInfo),
uid(rstUid,rto,t1),
uid(rstrUid,id2,t2),
isSTS(Sts,StsInfo,uriSTS,subjSTS,sx,certSTS),
isX509TokenPub(kr,BaseToken,u,Basetokenid,ku,certU),
mkEncryptedKey(etok,stsEntropy,ku,certU),
NonEntropicRSTR(rstr,srvURI,BaseToken,uriSTS,sctid,etok),
X509Token(STSToken,certSTS),
mkSignature(sig2,"rsasha1",sx,
[<Body>rstr</>
<RelatesTo>rto</>
<Action>"RSTRSCT"</>
<MessageId>id2</>
<Created>t2</>]),
envRSTR(msgrstr,rstr,id2,t2,STSToken,sig2,rto).
// ==============================
// Check Message RSTR
// Entropy case
predicate isEntropicRSTREnvelope(msgrstr:item,kr:bytes,partialSC:item,
rstUid:item,clientEntropy:bytes,
rstrUid:item,sctid:string,stsEntropy:bytes) :−
PartialSC(partialSC,"Both",BaseToken,StsInfo,srvURI,ExtraInfo),
uid(rstUid,rto,t1),
isSTSPubInfo(StsInfo,uriSTS,certSTS),
envRSTR(msgrstr,rstr,id2,t2,STSToken,sig2,rto),
EntropicRSTR(rstr,srvURI,BaseToken,uriSTS,sctid,etok),
isEncryptedKeySym(etok,stsEntropy,clientEntropy),
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X509Token(STSToken,certSTS),
isX509Cert(certSTS,kr,subjSTS,"rsasha1",ek),
isSignature(sig2,"rsasha1",ek,
[<Body>rstr</>
<RelatesTo>rto</>
<Action>"RSTRSCT"</>
<MessageId>id2</>
<Created>t2</>]),
uid(rstrUid,id2,t2).
// No Entropy case
predicate isNonEntropicRSTREnvelope(msgrstr:item,kr:bytes,U:item,partialSC:item,
rstUid:item,rstrUid:item,sctid:string,stsEntropy:bytes) :−
PartialSC(partialSC,"Server",BaseToken,StsInfo,srvURI,ExtraInfo),
uid(rstUid,rto,t1),
envRSTR(msgrstr,rstr,id2,t2,STSToken,sig2,rto),
X509Token(STSToken,certSTS),
uid(rstrUid,id2,t2),
NonEntropicRSTR(rstr,srvURI,BaseToken,uriSTS,sctid,etok),
isX509User(U,u,sk,certU,kr),
isEncryptedKey(etok,stsEntropy,sk,certU),
isSTSPubInfo(StsInfo,uriSTS,certSTS),
isX509Cert(certSTS,kr,subjSTS,"rsasha1",ek),
isSignature(sig2,"rsasha1",ek,
[<Body>rstr</>
<RelatesTo>rto</>
<Action>"RSTRSCT"</>
<MessageId>id2</>
<Created>t2</>]).
// =============================
// Act as a client, on behalf of U
//channel init(string,item,item,string,item,item).
channel init(item,string).
private channel anySCClient(item).
event C1(string,item,item,bytes).
event C2(string,string,item,item,item).
process ClientSC(kr:bytes) =
in init (partialSC,t1);
in anyPrincipal(U);
new id1:string;
filter uid(rstUid,id1,t1) → rstUid;
filter PartialSC(partialSC,entropyMode,UserToken,StsInfo,x1,x2) → entropyMode,UserToken,StsInfo,x1,x2;
filter isPrincipal(UserToken,u) → u;
filter isSTSInfo(StsInfo,uriSTS,subjSTS,ekSTS,certSTS) → uriSTS,subjSTS,ekSTS,certSTS;
// depending on attacker’s choice, branch
if entropyMode="Both" then
(
new clientEntropy:bytes;
filter mkEntropicRSTEnvelope(msgrst,kr,U,partialSC,rstUid,clientEntropy) →msgrst;
begin C1 (u,partialSC,rstUid,clientEntropy);
out soap(msgrst);
in soap(msgrstr);
filter isEntropicRSTREnvelope(msgrstr,kr,partialSC,rstUid,clientEntropy,rstrUid,sctid,stsEntropy)→ rstrUid,sctid,stsEntropy;
filter fillSC(fullSC,partialSC,sctid,psha1(base64(clientEntropy),stsEntropy))→ fullSC;
end C2 (u,subjSTS,fullSC,rstUid,rstrUid);
!out anySCClient(fullSC))
else (if entropyMode="Server" then
(
filter mkNonEntropicRSTEnvelope(msgrst,kr,U,partialSC,rstUid) →msgrst;
filter remCertPartialSC(partialSC,remCertSC) → remCertSC;
begin C1 (u,remCertSC,rstUid,utf8("zero"));
out soap(msgrst);
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in soap(msgrstr);
filter isNonEntropicRSTREnvelope(msgrstr,kr,U,partialSC,rstUid,rstrUid,sctid,stsEntropy)→ rstrUid,sctid,stsEntropy;
filter fillSC(fullSC,partialSC,sctid,stsEntropy)→ fullSC;
end C2 (u,subjSTS,fullSC,rstUid,rstrUid);
!out anySCClient(fullSC))).
event LeakSC(item).
channel leakSC(string).
process ClientSCLeak() =
in leakSC(sctid);
in anySCClient(sc);
filter SC(sc,sctid,sctkey,x1,x2,x3,x4,x5)→ sctkey,x1,x2,x3,x4,x5;
event LeakSC(sc);
out publish(base64(sctkey)).
// ================================
// STS Token Server
private channel anySCService(item).
//channel accept(string,string).
channel accept(string).
process STS(kr:bytes) =
in soap(msgrst);
in anyPrincipal(U);
in anySTS(Sts);
filter isRSTEnvelope(msgrst,kr,U,Sts,partialSC,rstUid,clientEntropy)→ partialSC,rstUid,clientEntropy;
filter PartialSC(partialSC,entropyMode,UserToken,StsInfo,x1,x2) → entropyMode,UserToken,StsInfo,x1,x2;
filter isPrincipal(UserToken,u) → u;
// in accept (id2,t2);
in accept (t2);
new sctid:string;
new stsEntropy:bytes;
new id2:string;
filter uid(rstrUid,id2,t2) → rstrUid;
filter isSTSInfo(StsInfo,uriSTS,subjSTS,ekSTS,certSTS) → uriSTS,subjSTS,ekSTS,certSTS;
if entropyMode="Both" then
(
end C1 (u,partialSC,rstUid,clientEntropy);
filter mkEntropicRSTREnvelope(msgrstr,kr,Sts,partialSC,rstUid,clientEntropy,rstrUid,sctid,stsEntropy) →msgrstr;
filter fillSC(fullSC,partialSC,sctid,psha1(base64(clientEntropy),stsEntropy))→ fullSC;
begin C2 (u,subjSTS,fullSC,rstUid,rstrUid);
out soap(msgrstr);
!out anySCService(fullSC))
else
(
if entropyMode="Server" then
(
filter remCertPartialSC(partialSC,remCertSC) → remCertSC;
end C1 (u,remCertSC,rstUid,utf8("zero"));
filter mkNonEntropicRSTREnvelope(msgrstr,kr,Sts,partialSC,rstUid,rstrUid,sctid,stsEntropy) →msgrstr;
filter fillSC(fullSC,partialSC,sctid,stsEntropy)→ fullSC;
begin C2 (u,subjSTS,fullSC,rstUid,rstrUid);
out soap(msgrstr);
!out anySCService(fullSC))).
B.2.2 WS-Trust: Correspondences and Secrecy Assertions
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// Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
// wstrust corresp.tf−Model of Trust/SecureConversation
// Part 1: SCT establishment, RST/RSTR exchange
// This file contains a top−level process for modelling exchanges of RST/RSTR,
// plus queries for correspondences of C1 and C2.
import "library.tf".
import "common.tf".
import "wstrust.tf".
channel soap(item), publish(string).
// Basic functional properties.
//query end:C1(C10,C11,"Server",C13,C14,C15).
query begin:C1(C11,C12,C13,C14).
query end:C1(C11,C12,C13,C14).
// query begin:C1(C1e1,C1e2,C1e3,C1e4,C1e5,C1e6,C1e7,"Server",C1e9).
// query end:C1(C11,C12,C13,C14,C15,C16,C17,"Both",C19).
// query begin:C1(C1e1,C1e2,C1e3,C1e4,C1e5,C1e6,C1e7,"Both",C1e9).
// query end:C1(C1u,C1sc,C1uid,C1clent) ==> LeakPrincipal(C1u).
// query end:C1(C1u,C1sc,C1uid,C1clent,"Server") ==> begin:C1(C1u,C1sc,C1uid,C1clent,"Server") |LeakPrincipal(C1u).
// query end:C1(C1u,C1sc,C1uid,C1clent,"Server") ==> LeakPrincipal(C1u).
// Theorem 1 part 1
query end:C1(C1u,C1sc,C1uid,C1clent) ==> begin:C1(C1u,C1sc,C1uid,C1clent) |LeakPrincipal(C1u).
// // C2: RSTR correspondence + correlation with RST between client and STS
query end:C2(C20,C21,C22,C23,C24).
query begin:C2(C2e0,C2e1,C2e2,C2e3,C2e4).
// query end:C2(C21,C22,C23,C24,C25,"Both").
// query begin:C2(C2e1,C2e2,C2e3,C2e4,C2e5,"Server").
// query end:C2(C2u,C2sts,C2sc,C2uid1,C2uid2) ==>
// LeakPrincipal(C2u) |LeakPrincipal(C2sts).
// Theorem 1 part 2
query end:C2(C2u,C2sts,C2sc,C2uid1,C2uid2) ==>
begin:C2(C2u,C2sts,C2sc,C2uid1,C2uid2) |
LeakPrincipal(C2u) |LeakPrincipal(C2sts).
// Theorem 2
//private name clientEntropy:bytes.
//private name stsEntropy:bytes.
//secret clientEntropy.
//secret stsEntropy.
// =================================
// Simulation
simulate with 0.
new sr:bytes; let kr = pk(sr);
out publish(base64(kr));
( !MkPrincipal()
|!MkPrincipalCert(sr)
|!MkPrincipalLeak(kr)
|!MkSTS(kr)
|!ClientSC(kr)
|!STS(kr)
)
B.3 Predicates and Processes for WS-SecureConversation
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// Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
// wssecconv common.tf−Model of Trust/SecureConversation
predicate DKSCT(dksct:item,sctid:string,nonce:bytes):−
dksct = <DerivedKeyToken>
<SecurityTokenReference>
<Reference>sctid</>
<valueType>"SCT"</></>
<Nonce>base64(nonce)</></>.
// =============================
// Envelope template for Messages
predicate env(Env:item,DestInfo:items,t:string,
sig:item,ebody:item,sctid:string,
mode:item) :−
Env = <Envelope>
<Header>
<Security>
<Timestamp><Created>t</></>
sct
sig</> @ DestInfo</>
<Body>ebody</></>,
SCT(sct,sctid),
nonDerivedKeyMode(mode).
predicate env(Env:item,DestInfo:items,t:string,sig,ebody:item,
sctid:string,mode:item) :−
Env = <Envelope>
<Header>
<Security>
<Timestamp><Created>t</></>
sct dksctEnc dksctSig
sig</> @
DestInfo </>
<Body>ebody</></>,
SCT(sct,sctid),
DKSCT(dksctEnc,sctid,EncNonce), DKSCT(dksctSig,sctid,SigNonce),
derivedKeyMode(mode,EncNonce,SigNonce).
predicate envb(Env:item,DestInfo:items,t:string,
sig:item,ebody:item,sctid:string,
mode:item) :−
nonDerivedKeyMode(mode),
SCT(sct,sctid),
Env =
<Envelope>
<Header>
<Security>
<Timestamp><Created>t</></>
sct
sig</> @ DestInfo</>
<Body>ebody</></>.
predicate envb(Env:item,DestInfo:items,t:string,
sig:item,ebody:item,sctid:string,
mode:item) :−
derivedKeyMode(mode,EncNonce,SigNonce),
SCT(sct,sctid),
DKSCT(dksctEnc,sctid,EncNonce),
DKSCT(dksctSig,sctid,SigNonce),
Env =
<Envelope>
<Header>
<Security>
<Timestamp><Created>t</></>
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sct dksctEnc dksctSig
sig</> @ DestInfo </>
<Body>ebody</></>.
predicate deriveKey(dk:bytes,key:bytes,nonce:bytes):−
dk = psha1(base64(nonce),key).
predicate computeKeys(mode:item,key:bytes,EncKey:bytes,SigKey:bytes):−
derivedKeyMode(mode,EncNonce,SigNonce),
deriveKey(EncKey,key,EncNonce),
deriveKey(SigKey,key,SigNonce).
predicate computeKeys(mode:item,key:bytes,EncKey:bytes,SigKey:bytes):−
nonDerivedKeyMode(mode),
EncKey = key,
SigKey = key.
// ==============================
// Make Message
predicate mkEnv(msg:item,EnvelopeInfo:item,sc:item,mode:item) :−
EnvInfo(EnvelopeInfo,t,sctid,DestInfo,b),
SC(sc,sctid,sckey,entropyMode,UserToken,StsInfo,appTo,extra),
computeKeys(mode,sckey,EncKey,SigKey),
mkEncryptedDataSym(ebody,b,EncKey),
mkSignature(sig,"hmacsha1",SigKey,
[ <Body>ebody</>
<Created>t</>
@ DestInfo ]),
envb(msg,DestInfo,t,sig,ebody,sctid,mode).
// ==============================
// Check Message
predicate isEnv(Env:item,EnvelopeInfo:item,SC:item,mode:item) :−
env(Env,DestInfo,t,sig,ebody,sctid,mode),
SC(SC,sctid,sckey,entropyMode,UserToken,StsInfo,appTo,extra),
computeKeys(mode,sckey,EncKey,SigKey),
isEncryptedDataSym(ebody,b,EncKey),
EnvInfo(EnvelopeInfo,t,sctid,DestInfo,b),
isSignature(sig,"hmacsha1",SigKey,
[<Body>ebody</> <Created>t</> @ DestInfo ]).
predicate sequence(Sequence:item,sessionId:string,msgNumber:bytes):−
Sequence = <Sequence>
<Identifier>sessionId</>
<MessageNumber>base64(msgNumber)</></>.
predicate destInfo(DestInfo:items,srvURI:item,srvAC:item,sessionId:string,msgNumber:bytes):−
DestInfo = [<To>srvURI</> <Action>srvAC</>
<Sequence>
<Identifier>sessionId</>
<MessageNumber>base64(msgNumber)</></>].
predicate destInfoResponse(DestInfoResponse:items,srvURI:item,sessionId:string,msgNumber:bytes):−
DestInfoResponse = [<From>srvURI</>
<SequenceAcknowledgement>
<Identifier>sessionId</>
<MessageNumber>base64(msgNumber)</></>].
// ===========================
channel genService(item).
private channel anyService(item).
process MkService() =
in genService(SrvInfo);
filter isService(SrvInfo,srvURI,srvAC) → srvURI,srvAC;
!out anyService(SrvInfo).
private channel anySCClient(item).
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private channel anySCService(item).
channel initMagic(string,item,item,string,item).
process magicSC() =
in initMagic(mode,UserToken,StsInfo,appTo,extra);
new sckey:bytes;
new sctid:string;
filter SC(sc,sctid,sckey,mode,UserToken,StsInfo,appTo,extra)→ sc;
out publish(sctid);
(!out anySCService(sc) |!out anySCClient(sc)).
event LeakSC(item).
channel initLeak(string).
process SCLeak() =
in initLeak(sctid);
in anySCClient(sc);
event LeakSC(sc);
out publish(base64(c14n(sc))).
// removed srvURI:string,srvAC:string,id:string
predicate EnvInfo(msg:item,t:string,sctid:string,DestInfo:items,b:item) :−
msg =
<Envelope>
<Header>
<Security>
<Timestamp><Created>t</></>
<SecurityContextToken>
<Identifier>sctid</>
</>
</> @
DestInfo
</>
<Body>b</></>.
// predicate partialEnvResp(msg:item,t:string,sctid:string,srvURI:string,id1:string,id2:string,b:item) :−
// msg =
// <Envelope>
// <Header>
// <Security>
// <Timestamp><Created>t</></>
// sct
// </>
// <From>srvURI</>
// <RelatesTo>id1</>
// <MessageId>id2</>
// </>
// <Body>b</></>,
// SCT(sct,sctid).
predicate derivedKeyMode(mode:item,EncNonce:bytes,SigNonce:bytes) :−
mode = <DKMode>
<EncryptionNonce>base64(EncNonce)</>
<SignatureNonce>base64(SigNonce)</>
</>.
predicate nonDerivedKeyMode(mode:item) :−
mode = <NonDerivedKeyMode></>.
predicate isDKMode(mode:item,modestr:string) :−
mode = <DKMode>
<EncryptionNonce>base64(EncNonce)</>
<SignatureNonce>base64(SigNonce)</>
</>,
modestr = "yes".
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predicate isDKMode(mode:item, modestr:string) :−
modestr = "no".
B.4 Authentication and Secrecy for a Two Message Conversation
(Theorem 3)
B.4.1 Two Message Conversation: Main Processes
// Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
// wssecconv.tf−Model of Trust/SecureConversation
// Part 2: using the SC
//This file contains predicates to create envelopes for messages 1 and 2, exchanged using the SCT.
// This file contains parts included by draft.tex
event C3(item,item,item).
event C4(item,item,item,item,item).
predicate destInfoReq(DestInfo:items,srvURI:item,srvAC:item,id1:string):−
DestInfo = [<To>srvURI</> <Action>srvAC</> <MessageId>id1</>].
// ’responseId’ added
predicate destInfoResp(DestInfoResponse:items,srvURI:item,id1:string,id2:string):−
DestInfoResponse = [<From>srvURI</> <RelatesTo>id1</> <MessageId>id2</>].
// Service
channel acceptService(string,string).
process Service(SrvInfo:item) =
in soap(msg1);
in anySCService(sc);
filter isService(SrvInfo,srvURI,srvAC)→ srvAC,srvURI;
filter isEnv(msg1,Request,sc,RequestMode) →Request, RequestMode;
end C3 (Request,sc,RequestMode);
filter EnvInfo(Request,t1,sctid,DestInfo,b) → t1,sctid,DestInfo,b;
filter destInfoReq(DestInfo,srvURI,srvAC,id1)→ id1;
new EncNonce2:bytes;
new SigNonce2:bytes;
in acceptService (id2,t2);
filter destInfoResp(DestInfoResponse,srvURI,id1,id2)→DestInfoResponse;
filter isDKMode(RequestMode,DerivedKeyMode) →DerivedKeyMode;
if DerivedKeyMode = "yes" then
(
filter derivedKeyMode(ResponseMode,EncNonce2,SigNonce2) →ResponseMode;
filter EnvInfo(Response,t2,sctid,DestInfoResponse,b2) →Response;
begin C4 (Request,sc,RequestMode,Response,ResponseMode);
filter mkEnv(msg2,Response,sc,ResponseMode) →msg2;
out soap(msg2))
else
(
if DerivedKeyMode = "no" then
(
filter EnvInfo(Response,t2,sctid,DestInfoResponse,b2) →Response;
begin C4 (Request,sc,RequestMode,Response,RequestMode);
filter mkEnv(msg2,Response,sc,RequestMode) →msg2;
out soap(msg2)
)).
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// =============================
// Act as a client
channel initClient(item,string).
process Client() =
in initClient (Request,DerivedKeyMode);
filter EnvInfo(Request,t,sctid,DestInfoGiven,givenB) → t,sctid,DestInfoGiven,givenB;
new EncNonce1:bytes;
new SigNonce1:bytes;
new id1:string;
filter destInfoReq(DestInfoGiven,srvURI,srvAC,givenId) → srvURI,srvAC,givenId;
filter destInfoReq(DestInfo,srvURI,srvAC,id1) →DestInfo;
filter EnvInfo(RequestIdB,t,sctid,DestInfo,b1) →RequestIdB;
in anySCClient(sc);
if DerivedKeyMode="yes" then
(
filter derivedKeyMode(RequestMode,EncNonce1,SigNonce1) →RequestMode;
begin C3 (RequestIdB,sc,RequestMode);
filter mkEnv(msg1,RequestIdB,sc,RequestMode) →msg1;
out soap(msg1);
in soap(msg2);
filter isEnv(msg2,Response,sc,ResponseMode) →Response,ResponseMode;
filter EnvInfo(Response,t2,sctid,DestInfoResponse,b) → t2,DestInfoResponse,b;
filter destInfoResp(DestInfoResponse,srvURI,id1,id2) → id2;
filter derivedKeyMode(ResponseMode,EncNonce2,SigNonce2) → EncNonce2,SigNonce2;
end C4 (RequestIdB,sc,RequestMode,Response,ResponseMode)
)
else
(
filter nonDerivedKeyMode(RequestMode) →RequestMode;
begin C3 (RequestIdB,sc,RequestMode);
filter mkEnv(msg1,RequestIdB,sc,RequestMode) →msg1;
out soap(msg1);
in soap(msg2);
filter isEnv(msg2,Response,sc,RequestMode) →Response;
filter EnvInfo(Response,t2,sctid,DestInfoResponse,b) → t2,DestInfoResponse,b;
filter destInfoResp(DestInfoResponse,srvURI,id1,id2) → id2;
end C4 (RequestIdB,sc,RequestMode,Response,RequestMode)
).
B.4.2 Two Message Conversation: Correspondences and Secrecy Assertions
// Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
// wssecconv corresp.tf−Model of Trust/SecureConversation
// Part 2: using the SCT
import "library.tf".
import "common.tf".
import "wssecconv_common.tf".
import "wssecconv.tf".
channel soap(item), publish(string).
// secret bodies
private name b1:item.
private name b2:item.
// Basic functional properties
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//query begin:C3(C3partialEnv,C3sc,C3mode).
//query end:C3(C3partialEnv,C3sc,C3mode).
// query end:C3(C3partialEnv,C3sc,C3mode) ==> LeakSC(C3sc).
// query begin:C4(C3partialEnv,C3sc,C3mode,C4partialEnvResp,C4mode2).
// query end:C4(C3partialEnv,C3sc,C3mode,C4partialEnvResp,C4mode2).
// query end:C4(C3partialEnv,C3sc,C3mode,C4partialEnvResp,C4mode) ==> LeakSC(C4sc).
// Theorem 3 part 1
query end:C3(C3partialEnv,C3sc,C3mode) ==> begin:C3(C3partialEnv,C3sc,C3mode) |LeakSC(C3sc).
// Theorem 3, part 2
query end:C4(C3partialEnv,C3sc,C3mode1,C4partialEnvResp,C4mode2) ==>
begin:C4(C3partialEnv,C3sc,C3mode1,C4partialEnvResp,C4mode2) |LeakSC(C4sc).
// Theorem 3, part 3
secret b1.
secret b2.
// =================================
// Simulation
simulate with 0.
( !magicSC() |
!SCLeak() |
!MkService() |
(!in anyService(SrvInfo); Service(SrvInfo) ) |
(!Client()))
B.5 Authentication and Secrecy for an Open-Ended Conversation
(Theorem 4)
B.5.1 Open-Ended Conversation: Main Processes
// Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
// wssecconvn.tf−Model of Trust/SecureConversation
//This file contains predicates to create envelopes for messages 1 and 2, exchanged using the SCT.
predicate collect(newbody:item,oldbodies:items,newbodies:items) :−
newbodies = [newbody @ oldbodies].
// newbodies = [newbody].
event C3(item,item,bytes,bytes,bytes,string,string,items).
event C4(item,item,bytes,bytes,bytes,string,string,bytes,bytes,string,items).
channel acceptService(string,item).
process Service() =
in soap(msg1);
in sessionDbS(SrvInfo,sc,sessionId,lastbodies,msgNumber);
filter SC(sc,sctid,sckey,mode,UserToken,StsInfo,appTo,extra)
→ sctid,sckey,mode,UserToken,StsInfo,appTo,extra;
filter isEnv(msg1,DestInfo,"yes",EncNonce1,SigNonce1,sctid,sckey,t1,b1)
→DestInfo,EncNonce1,SigNonce1,t1,b1;
filter isService(SrvInfo,srvURI,srvAC)→ srvAC,srvURI;
filter destInfo(DestInfo,srvURI,srvAC,sessionId,msgNumber)→ ;
filter collect(b1,lastbodies,bodies) → bodies;
end C3 (SrvInfo,sc,EncNonce1,SigNonce1,msgNumber,sessionId,t1,bodies);
in acceptService (t2,b2);
new EncNonce2:bytes;
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new SigNonce2:bytes;
filter collect(b2,bodies,newbodies) → newbodies;
begin C4 (SrvInfo,sc,EncNonce1,SigNonce1,msgNumber,sessionId,t1,EncNonce2,SigNonce2,t2,newbodies);
filter destInfoResponse(DestInfoResponse, srvURI,sessionId,msgNumber)→DestInfoResponse;
filter mkEnv(msg2,DestInfoResponse,"yes",EncNonce2,SigNonce2,sctid,sckey,t2,b2)
→msg2;
out soap(msg2);
out sessionDbS(SrvInfo,sc,sessionId,newbodies,succ(msgNumber)).
// =============================
// Act as a client
channel initClient(string,item).
process Client() =
in initClient (t1,b1);
in sessionDb(SrvInfo,sc,sessionId,lastbodies,msgNumber);
filter isService(SrvInfo,srvURI,srvAC)→ srvAC,srvURI;
filter SC(sc,sctid,sckey,mode,UserToken,StsInfo,appTo,extra)
→ sckey,mode,UserToken,StsInfo,appTo,extra,sctid;
new EncNonce1:bytes;
new SigNonce1:bytes;
filter collect(b1,lastbodies,bodies) → bodies;
begin C3 (SrvInfo,sc,EncNonce1,SigNonce1,msgNumber,sessionId,t1,bodies);
filter destInfo(DestInfo,srvURI,srvAC,sessionId,msgNumber)→DestInfo;
filter mkEnv(msg1,DestInfo,"yes",EncNonce1,SigNonce1,sctid,sckey,t1,b1) →msg1;
out soap(msg1);
in soap(msg2);
filter isEnv(msg2,DestInfoResponse,"yes",EncNonce2,SigNonce2,sctid,sckey,t2,b2)
→DestInfoResponse,EncNonce2,SigNonce2,t2,b2;
filter destInfoResponse(DestInfoResponse,srvURI,sessionId,msgNumber)→ ;
filter collect(b2,bodies,newbodies) → newbodies;
end C4 (SrvInfo,sc,EncNonce1,SigNonce1,msgNumber,sessionId,t1,EncNonce2,SigNonce2,t2,newbodies);
out sessionDb(SrvInfo,sc,sessionId,newbodies,succ(msgNumber)).
// Abstractly...
//
// new sessionDb;
// C[
// new sessionId:string;
// out sessionDb(...,sessionId,zero()))
// ][
// !in sessionDb(...,sessionId,msgNumber);
// ...(linear)...;
// begin C3 (...,msgNumber,sessionId);
// ...(linear)...;
// out sessionDb(...,sessionId,succ(msgNumber)).
// ]
B.5.2 Open-Ended Conversation: Correspondences and Secrecy Assertions
// Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
// wssecconvn corresp.tf−Model of Trust/SecureConversation
// Part 2: using the SCT
import "library.tf".
import "common.tf".
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import "wssecconvn_common.tf".
import "wssecconvn.tf".
constructor zero():bytes.
constructor succ(bytes):bytes.
//destructor succ(bytes):bytes with succ(b)=b.
channel soap(item), publish(string).
// // private
// name b1:item.
// //private
// name b2:item.
// Functional properties
// query end:C4(C4SrvInfo,C4sc,C4EncNonce1,C4SigNonce1,C4msgNumber,C4sessionId,C4t1,C4EncNonce2,C4SigNonce2,C4t2,lC4astbodies).
// query begin:C4(C4SrvInfo,C4sc,C4EncNonce1,C4SigNonce1,C4msgNumber,C4sessionId,C4t1,C4EncNonce2,C4SigNonce2,C4t2,lC4astbodies).
query begin:C3(C3SrvInfo,C3sc,C3EncNonce1,C3SigNonce1,C3msgNumber,C3sessionId,C3t1,C3lastbodies).
// query end:C3(C3SrvInfo,C3sc,C3EncNonce1,C3SigNonce1,C3msgNumber,C3sessionId,C3t1,C3lastbodies).
// query LeakSC(SSC).
// // query end:C3(C3SrvInfo,C3sc,C3EncNonce1,C3SigNonce1,C3msgNumber,C3sessionId,C3t1,C3lastbodies) ==> LeakSC(C3sc).
// query end:C3(C3SrvInfo,C3sc,C3EncNonce1,C3SigNonce1,C3msgNumber,C3sessionId,C3t1,C3lastbodies)
// ==> begin:C3(C3SrvInfo,C3sc,C3EncNonce1,C3SigNonce1,C3msgNumber,C3sessionId,C3t1,C3lastbodies) |LeakSC(C3sc).
// query end:C4(C4SrvInfo,C4sc,C4EncNonce1,C4SigNonce1,C4msgNumber,C4sessionId,C4t1,C4EncNonce2,C4SigNonce2,C4t2,lC4astbodies)
// ==> begin:C4(C4SrvInfo,C4sc,C4EncNonce1,C4SigNonce1,C4msgNumber,C4sessionId,C4t1,C4EncNonce2,C4SigNonce2,C4t2,lC4astbodies) |
LeakSC(C4sc).
// secret b1.
// secret b2.
// =================================
// Simulation
simulate with 0.
channel ContextProvideSessionId(string).
channel newSession(string,item).
private channel sessionDbS(item,item,string,items,bytes).
private channel sessionDb(item,item,string,items,bytes).
( !MkService() |!magicSC() |!SCLeak() |
// services accept new session on any SC
(!in anyService(SrvInfo);
in anySCService(sc);
// as a simplification, we ask the context to provide the sessionId
in ContextProvideSessionId(sessionId);// with anti−replay cache
out sessionDbS(SrvInfo,sc,sessionId,[],zero()))
// services receive further messages
|!Service()
// clients can start new sessions on any SC
|(!in newSession(sctid,SrvInfo);
in anySCClient(sc);
filter SC(sc,sctid,sckey,mode,UserToken,StsInfo,appTo,extra)
→ sckey,mode,UserToken,StsInfo,appTo,extra;
new sessionId:string;
out sessionDb(SrvInfo,sc,sessionId,[],zero()))
// clients send messages using current sessions
|!Client()
)
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B.6 Authentication and Secrecy for an Abstract Open-Ended Con-
versation
B.6.1 Open-Ended Conversation Abstract Script: Main Processes
// Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
// Ricardo: Model of Trust/SecureConversation
//This file contains predicates to create envelopes for messages 1 and 2, exchanged using the SCT.
predicate collect(newbody:item,oldbodies:items,newbodies:items) :−
// newbodies = [newbody @ oldbodies].
newbodies = [newbody].
event C3(item,item,bytes,bytes,bytes,string,string,items).
event C4(item,item,bytes,bytes,bytes,string,string,bytes,bytes,string,items).
channel acceptService(string,item).
channel acceptExtra(bytes,items).
process Service() =
in soap(msg1);
in sessionDbS(SrvInfo,sc,sessionId);
in acceptExtra(msgNumber,lastbodies);
filter SC(sc,sctid,sckey,mode,UserToken,StsInfo,appTo,extra)
→ sctid,sckey,mode,UserToken,StsInfo,appTo,extra;
filter isEnv(msg1,DestInfo,"yes",EncNonce1,SigNonce1,sctid,sckey,t1,b1)
→DestInfo,EncNonce1,SigNonce1,t1,b1;
filter isService(SrvInfo,srvURI,srvAC)→ srvAC,srvURI;
filter destInfo(DestInfo,srvURI,srvAC,sessionId,msgNumber)→ ;
filter collect(b1,lastbodies,bodies) → bodies;
end C3 (SrvInfo,sc,EncNonce1,SigNonce1,msgNumber,sessionId,t1,bodies);
in acceptService (t2,b2);
new EncNonce2:bytes;
new SigNonce2:bytes;
filter collect(b2,bodies,newbodies) → newbodies;
begin C4 (SrvInfo,sc,EncNonce1,SigNonce1,msgNumber,sessionId,t1,EncNonce2,SigNonce2,t2,newbodies);
filter destInfoResponse(DestInfoResponse, srvURI,sessionId,msgNumber)→DestInfoResponse;
filter mkEnv(msg2,DestInfoResponse,"yes",EncNonce2,SigNonce2,sctid,sckey,t2,b2)
→msg2;
out soap(msg2);
out sessionDbS(SrvInfo,sc,sessionId).
// =============================
// Act as a client
channel initClient(string,item,items,bytes). // two extra args
process Client() =
in initClient (t1,b1,lastbodies,msgNumber);
in sessionDb(SrvInfo,sc,sessionId);
filter isService(SrvInfo,srvURI,srvAC)→ srvAC,srvURI;
filter SC(sc,sctid,sckey,mode,UserToken,StsInfo,appTo,extra)
→ sckey,mode,UserToken,StsInfo,appTo,extra,sctid;
new EncNonce1:bytes;
new SigNonce1:bytes;
51
filter collect(b1,lastbodies,bodies) → bodies;
begin C3 (SrvInfo,sc,EncNonce1,SigNonce1,msgNumber,sessionId,t1,bodies);
filter destInfo(DestInfo,srvURI,srvAC,sessionId,msgNumber)→DestInfo;
filter mkEnv(msg1,DestInfo,"yes",EncNonce1,SigNonce1,sctid,sckey,t1,b1) →msg1;
out soap(msg1);
in soap(msg2);
filter isEnv(msg2,DestInfoResponse,"yes",EncNonce2,SigNonce2,sctid,sckey,t2,b2)
→DestInfoResponse,EncNonce2,SigNonce2,t2,b2;
filter destInfoResponse(DestInfoResponse,srvURI,sessionId,msgNumber)→ ;
filter collect(b2,bodies,newbodies) → newbodies;
end C4 (SrvInfo,sc,EncNonce1,SigNonce1,msgNumber,sessionId,t1,EncNonce2,SigNonce2,t2,newbodies);
out sessionDb(SrvInfo,sc,sessionId).
// Abstractly...
//
// new sessionDb;
// C[
// new sessionId:string;
// out sessionDb(...,sessionId,zero()))
// ][
// !in sessionDb(...,sessionId,msgNumber);
// ...(linear)...;
// begin C3 (...,msgNumber,sessionId);
// ...(linear)...;
// out sessionDb(...,sessionId,succ(msgNumber)).
// ]
B.6.2 Open-Ended Conversation Abstract Script: Correspondences and Secrecy
Assertions
// Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
// Ricardo: Model of Trust/SecureConversation
//
// Part 2: using the SCT
import "library.tf".
import "common.tf".
import "wssecconvn_common.tf".
import "wssecconva.tf".
constructor zero():bytes.
constructor succ(bytes):bytes.
//destructor succ(bytes):bytes with succ(b)=b.
channel soap(item), publish(string).
// private
// name b1:item.
// private
// name b2:item.
// Checking reachability of events...
// query end:C4(C4SrvInfo,C4sc,C4EncNonce1,C4SigNonce1,C4msgNumber,C4sessionId,C4t1,C4EncNonce2,C4SigNonce2,C4t2,lC4astbodies).
// query begin:C4(C4SrvInfo,C4sc,C4EncNonce1,C4SigNonce1,C4msgNumber,C4sessionId,C4t1,C4EncNonce2,C4SigNonce2,C4t2,lC4astbodies).
// query begin:C3(C3SrvInfo,C3sc,C3EncNonce1,C3SigNonce1,C3msgNumber,C3sessionId,C3t1,C3lastbodies).
// query end:C3(C3SrvInfo,C3sc,C3EncNonce1,C3SigNonce1,C3msgNumber,C3sessionId,C3t1,C3lastbodies).
// query LeakSC(SSC).
// query end:C3(C3SrvInfo,C3sc,C3EncNonce1,C3SigNonce1,C3msgNumber,C3sessionId,C3t1,C3lastbodies) ==> LeakSC(C3sc).
// Lemma 3
query end:C3(C3SrvInfo,C3sc,C3EncNonce1,C3SigNonce1,C3msgNumber,C3sessionId,C3t1,C3lastbodies) ==>
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begin:C3(C3SrvInfo,C3sc,C3EncNonce1,C3SigNonce1,C3msgNumber,C3sessionId,C3t1,C3lastbodies) |LeakSC(C3sc).
// Lemma 3
// query end:C4(C4SrvInfo,C4sc,C4EncNonce1,C4SigNonce1,C4msgNumber,C4sessionId,C4t1,C4EncNonce2,C4SigNonce2,C4t2,C4lastbodies)
// ==>begin:C4(C4SrvInfo,C4sc,C4EncNonce1x,C4SigNonce1x,C4msgNumberx,C4sessionId,C4t1x,C4EncNonce2,C4SigNonce2,C4t2,C4lastbodiesx) |
LeakSC(C4sc).
// Used in Theorem 5, second part
// secret b1.
// secret b2.
// =================================
// Simulation
simulate with 0.
channel ContextProvideSessionId(string).
channel newSession(string,item).
private channel sessionDbS(item,item,string).
private channel sessionDb(item,item,string).
( !MkService() |!magicSC() |!SCLeak() |
// services accept new session on any SC
(!in anyService(SrvInfo);
in anySCService(sc);
// as a simplification, we ask the context to provide the sessionId
in ContextProvideSessionId(sessionId);
out sessionDbS(SrvInfo,sc,sessionId))
// services receive further messages
|!Service()
// clients can start new sessions on any SC
|(!in newSession(sctid,SrvInfo);
in anySCClient(sc);
filter SC(sc,sctid,sckey,mode,UserToken,StsInfo,appTo,extra)
→ sckey,mode,UserToken,StsInfo,appTo,extra;
new sessionId:string;
out sessionDb(SrvInfo,sc,sessionId))
// clients send messages using current sessions
|!Client()
)
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